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Preemption in the Rehnquist Court:
A Preliminary Empirical Assessment
Michael S. Greve and Jonathan Klick*
The federal preemption of state law has emerged as a promi-
nent field of study for legal scholars and political scientists.
This rise to prominence of a technical and often dull field of
jurisprudence is due to a number of developments-increas-
ingly frequent federal statutory preemptions; the states' un-
precedented aggressiveness in regulating business transac-
tions, the expansion of corporate liability under state common
law and the increased resort of corporate defendants to fed-
eral preemption defenses; and, not least, the Rehnquist
Court's discovery of federalism and states' rights.
Unfortunately, the preemption debate has been marred by
misperceptions and a lack of reliable data. Extravagant atten-
tion has been lavished on a few landmark cases, which may
not be a reliable guide to the preemption universe. Studies of
judicial behavior in this area have relied on an inadequate
empirical foundation.
This Article presents an empirical overview and a prelimi-
nary analysis of the Rehnquist Court's preemption decisions.
Part II describes the case universe and the outcomes. Part III
discusses the role of the Supreme Court-more precisely, the
Court's perception of its own role-in preemption litigation.
Part IV suggests that outcomes in preemption cases may be
most readily explained as judicial responses to certain signals
* Michael S. Greve, John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Jonathan
Klick, Jeffrey A. Stoops Professor of Law, Florida State University. For helpful com-
ments and suggestions on an earlier draft, we are indebted to Eric Claeys, Robert Gas-
away, Thomas W Merrill, Dan Schweitzer, and Edward Warren. Kim Hendrickson ca-
pably supervised a changing team of research assistants and interns. All errors are ours.
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or "cues." TWo signals in particular prove significant: the
presence of a state as a party to a preemption dispute, and
the position of the Solicitor General. State amicus briefs
and the partisan affiliation of the Solicitor General (Demo-
crat or Republican) may also affect preemption case out-
comes; however, we cannot show either variable to be statis-
tically significant.
Part V examines the justices' votes in preemption cases
and addresses the discontinuity between the Rehnquist
Court's federalism cases and its preemption decisions. The
Court's federalism decisions have, until very recently, worked
a major doctrinal shift in federal-state relations, in favor of
the states. That shift has been the work of a stable bloc of five
conservative justices, who have carried the federalism banner
against a bloc of four liberal justices. In preemption cases, in
contrast, liberals often vote against preemption (and thus "for
the states"), whereas conservative justices often flip-flop in
the opposite direction. We find substantial evidence to but-
tress the impression of preemption cases as a mirror image of
pure federalism cases. Unlike federalism law, however, pre-
emption law shows no clear decisional trend. Moreover, we
find no firm voting blocs and no swing vote.
The concluding Part VI re-examines the perceived disconti-
nuity between the Rehnquist Court's federalism and preemp-
tion decisions in light of the evidence and argues that a satis-
factory explanation of that phenomenon is bound to be more
complicated than a simple "attitudinal" model of judicial be-
havior would suggest.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decisions on the federal preemp-
tion of state law have emerged as a prominent field of study for legal
scholars and political scientists from a broad range of perspectives.'
'For a small sample of the voluminous literature see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Political Process, University
of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 16, 2003, online at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art 16; Richard
Fallon, The Conservative Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69
U Chi L Rev 429 (2002); Ernest Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill L Rev
1349 (2001); Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S Cal L Rev
741 (2000); Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Georgetown L J 2085
(2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225 (2000); Brady Baybeck and William
Lowry, Federalism Outcomes and Ideological Preferences: The U.S. Supreme Court
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This rise to prominence of a highly technical and often dull field of
jurisprudence is due to a number of developments: increasingly fre-
quent federal statutory preemptions; 2 the states' unprecedented ag-
gressiveness in regulating business transactions,3 in areas from health
care provision4 to banking5 to antitrust, 6 that are also covered by fed-
eral laws; the expansion of corporate liability under state common
law and the increased resort of those defendants to federal preemp-
tion defenses;' and, not least, the Rehnquist Court's discovery of fed-
eralism and states' rights.8 Preemption cases have enormous conse-
and Preemption Cases, 30:3 Publius 73 (2000); David B. Spence and Paula Murray, The
Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative
Analysis, 87 Cal L Rev 1125 (1999); Ernest Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 Geo Wash L
Rev 273 (1999); David M. O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court and Federal Preemption: In
Search of a Theory, 23 Publius 15 (1993); Kenneth Starr, et al, The Law of Preemption
(American Bar Assoc, 1991); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Re-
publican Virtues, 71 B U L Rev 685 (1991); and Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Feder-
alism: The Missing Link, 16 Hastings Const L Q 69 (1988). See also sources cited
throughout this article.
2 For (now somewhat dated) evidence see U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations, Federal Statutory Preemption of State and Local Authority: His-
tory, Inventory, and Issues (UACIR, 1992).
3 See generally Christopher Swope, Made in Sacramento, Governing 34-38 (July,
2003).
4 See, e.g., Elaine Gareri Kenney, For the Sake of Your Health: ERISA's Preemption
Provisions, HMO Accountability, and Consumer Access to State Law Remedies, 38
USF L Rev 361 (2004); and Gregory J. Scandaglia and Therese L. Tully, Express Pre-
emption and Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 Food
& Drug L J J2004).
' See, e.g., Robert C. Eager and C.E Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemption and the
Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking System, 8 NC Banking Inst 21
(2004).
6 See, e.g., Robert W Hahn and Anne-Layne Farrar, The Case for Federal Preemp-
tion in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 SPG Antitrust 79 (2004).
7 See, e.g., Stacey Allan Carroll, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Claims, 36 Ga L Rev 797 (2002); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B U L Rev 559 (1997); Young, 46 Vill L Rev at
1383-1384 (cited in note 1) ( noting that state common law has emerged as a central
preemption concern); Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 Tex Rev L & Polit 93,
120 (2002) (same); David S. Casey, Jr., The Preemption Danger, 40 Trial 9 (2004) (la-
menting "unprecedented effort to preempt the civil justice system in the states.").
8 See, e.g., United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995); United States v Morrison, 529
US 598 (2000) (re-limiting congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); City
of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) (requiring congruence and proportionality for
1 4 1h Amendment enforcement legislation); Seminole Tribe of Florida vFlorida, 517 US
44 (1996) (protection of state sovereign immunity under Article I legislation); Printz v
United States, 521 US 898 (1997) (barring federal "commandeering" of state execu-
tive); New York v United States, 505 US 144 (1992) (barring federal "commandeering"
of state legislature); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1991) (requiring "clear state-
ment" of congressional intent as prerequisite for regulating states as states).
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quences both for private interest groups (such as business and the
plaintiffs' bar) and for federal-state relations.
Unfortunately, the preemption debate has been marred by misper-
ceptions and a lack of reliable empirical data. Especially in the law re-
views, extravagant attention has been lavished on a handful of land-
mark cases-which, for all their undeniable significance, may not be
a reliable guide to the preemption universe. 9 Studies of judicial be-
havior in this area, meanwhile, have relied on an inadequate empiri-
cal foundation. Even the most complete, up-to-date, and widely-used
data set, the United States Supreme Court Judicial Data Base, '0 con-
tains only a sample of "preemption" cases-a good number of which
do not conform to something a competent lawyer would recognize as
preemption.I' These omissions and errors have probably contributed
to misconceptions-prominently, the widespread impression of a
sharp discontinuity between the Rehnquist Court's "pro-state" feder-
alism decisions and its "nationalist" preemption decisions.' 2 The em-
pirical evidence, we shall see, is considerably more complicated.
This Article identifies the universe of Rehnquist Court preemp-
tion decisions, excluding only the 2004-2005 term. Our study extends
exclusively to statutory preemption (as opposed to constitutional pre-
emption) and, in defining that universe, follows the lawyers' under-
standing of "preemption," rather than the looser definitions some-
times adopted by political scientists. 13 In addition, we provide some
preliminary analysis and findings. Part II describes the case universe
and outcomes. Part III discusses the role of the Supreme Court-more
precisely, the Court's perception of its own role-in preemption litiga-
tion. Moving further from description to analysis, Part IV suggests that
outcomes in preemption cases may be most readily explained as judi-
cial responses to, or interpretations of, certain signals or "cues," such
as the identity of the parties or the posture of a given case. 14 Two sig-
9 See text at note 35, infra.
10 Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database,
1953-2002 Terms, (last updated Dec. 11, 2003), online at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/
pljp/sctdata1 .html.
I See Appendix B, infra.
12 See, e.g., Baybeck and Lowry, 30:3 Publius 73 (cited in note 1); Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited at 420-422
(Cambridge, 2002); and Cross and Tiller, 73 S Cal L Rev at 753-754 (cited in note 2).
13 See, e.g., U.S. Advisory Commission, Federal Statutory Preemption (cited in
note 2).
11 The classic exposition of "cue theory" is Joseph Tanenhaus, et al, The Supreme
Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in Glendon Schubert, ed, Judicial Deci-
sion Making 111 (Free Press, 1963). See also S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze and
Louise Kirklosky, The Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration
of Cue Theory, 7 L & Soc Rev 637 (1972); Virginia Armstrong and Charles A. Johnson,
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nals in particular prove significant: the presence of a state as a party to
a preemption dispute, and the position of the Solicitor General. State
amicus briefs and the partisan affiliation of the Solicitor General (De-
mocrat or Republican) may also affect preemption case outcomes; how-
ever, we cannot show either variable to be statistically significant.
Part V examines the justices' votes in preemption cases and, in par-
ticular, the already-mentioned perception of a discontinuity between
the Rehnquist Court's federalism cases and its preemption decisions.
The Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions have, until very recently,
worked a major doctrinal shift in federal-state relations, in favor of
the states.'5 That shift has been the work of a stable bloc of five con-
servative justices, who have carried the federalism banner against a
bloc of four liberal justices. In preemption law, in contrast, the justices
often seem to "switch sides": liberals almost always vote "against the
states" in federalism cases-and often against preemption, and thus
"for the states," in preemption cases. Conservative justices often flip-
flop in the opposite direction. We do find evidence that explains the
impression of preemption cases as a mirror image of pure federalism
cases. But that impression is in some ways misleading. In contrast to
federalism law, we find no clear decisional trend in preemption law.
Moreover, we find no firm voting blocs and no swing vote.
As its title suggests, our study is preliminary. First, a fully satisfac-
tory account of the Rehnquist Court preemption record will require
additional empirical evidence. We have collected but not yet evalu-
ated some of that evidence, and we will note the lacunae throughout.
Second, our principal purpose is descriptive. We do not develop or test
a formal model of judicial decision-making on preemption, federalism,
or anything else. The predominant, "attitudinal" model of judicial be-
havior essentially holds that judges vote their policy preferences.' 6
Increasingly popular "strategic actor" models of judicial behavior
proceed from the same premise but emphasize that judges must pur-
sue those preferences in a setting of institutional constraints, both in-
ternal (notably, the expected behavior of other judges on the same
Certiorari Decision Making by the Warren and Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time
Bound? 15 Polity 141 (1982); and sources cited in note 47, infra.
'1 Recent decisions strongly suggest that the Court's federalism enthusiasm may
have run its course. See esp. Gonzales v Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005); Nevada v Hibbs,
538 US 721 (2003); and Tennessee v Lane, 541 US 509 (2004). Up to that point, how-
ever, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence was marked by a pronounced shift towards
judicially enforceable protections for federalism and states' rights. See generally,
Michael S. Greve, Real Federalism (Amer Enterprise Inst, 1999).
16 The standard expositions of the "attitudinal model" of Supreme Court behav-
ior are Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model (Cambridge, 1993); Segal and Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited (cited in
note 12).
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court) and external (such as Congress or administrative agencies)." A
third, "legal" model of judicial behavior holds that judges will strive to
follow the law, as embodied in statutes or precedents. A "cue" or sig-
naling theory does not map easily onto any of these models, at least
not in the rudimentary form that we have chosen to employ.18
Naturally, we would be gratified if our account were to prompt more
rigorous efforts to explain outcomes and judicial behavior in preemp-
tion cases. We suspect, though, that only a very sophisticated model
will answer to the task. Preemption cases are multi-dimensional in at
least two ways. First, they bring one conservative value (pro-business)
in conflict with another conservative value (pro-state). The same is of
course true of the corresponding liberal values. Second, preemption
cases typically involve layers of legal issues-not only the federal-
state balance but also statutory interpretation, the standard of review
of administrative agency action, the role of economic reasoning in
complex regulatory cases, and other matters. Look hard enough at a
case that is conveniently subsumed under the general heading of
"preemption": it often becomes difficult to tell what it is a case of. 19
These complexities will confound any simple behavioralist model. In
particular, they confound any simplistic effort to explain the discon-
tinuity between the justices' votes in federalism and preemption
cases as a triumph of pro- or anti-business attitudes over opportunis-
tically deployed federalism "principles.' 20 A plausible (and norma-
tively fair) explanation is bound to be much more complicated. The
concluding Part VI sketches our thoughts on these questions.
17 See Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J. W Zorn, Sophisticated
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15:3 J L, Econ, & Org 549 (1999); Lee
Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices (Cong Quart, 1998); Forrest Maltzman,
et al, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge, 2000);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal L Rev 613 (1991).
i" Under any plausible theory a judge will have to use cues or signals to screen and
organize information. But that tells us nothing about the progeny or tendency of the
screening devices. Some may be ruthlessly attitudinal ("I will always vote against a big
business party"); others may be legal ("I will follow the Solicitor General unless I have
a powerful reason to distrust his averments"); still others may be ambiguous ("I will
trust states but not private litigants when it comes to federalism arguments").
19 Prominently, the justices have disagreed on whether preemption cases have to do
with "federalism" or rather should be understood as pure statutory construction cases.
In AT&T Corp v Iowa Utils Bd, 525 US 366 (1999), for example, Justice Scalia (writing
for the majority) expressed his puzzlement about the appearance of "federalism" ar-
guments in Justice Breyer's dissent. In Geier v Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861 (2000), it
was Justice Stevens' turn to invoke federalism arguments against Justice Breyer's pro-
preemption opinion for the Court-which declined to discuss "states' rights" issues.
20 See, e.g., Baybeck and Lowry, 30:3 Publius at 74 (cited in note 1) ("Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia, both prominent advocates of states' rights, abandoned
federalism and joined the majority in protecting Honda's interests" [in Geier v Honda,
529 US 861 (1999)1).
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II. PREEMPTION CASES AND OUTCOMES
A. Case Volume
We identified 105 preemption cases that were decided by written
opinion(s), listed in Appendix A by Term, case name, and citation.
Our case search and examination are described in Appendix B. Pre-
emption cases range in frequency from two cases in the 1997-98 Term
to a high of 13 (1986-87), with an average of slightly under six cases
per Term. Figure 1 shows the distribution.
no
E
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Term
Figure 1. Cases by Term
Following Thomas Merrill, 2' we distinguish between the "First"
Rehnquist Court ("FRC") and the "Second" Rehnquist Court ("SRC").
As indicated by the vertical line in Figure 1, the First Rehnquist
Court comprises the eight Terms between 1986-87 and 1993-94. The
Second Rehnquist Court encompasses the ten Terms from 1994-95
to 2003-04. For that entire duration, the Court-following Justice
Stephen Breyer's appointment in 1994-has been sitting in its current
composition. The distinction has the incidental advantage of cutting
21 Thomas W Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 SLU L J 569 (2003). Merrill's thought-provoking article argues that the
Second Rehnquist Court's stable composition, by enhancing the justices' ability to pre-
dict each other's votes, may explain important aspects of the Court's performance. The
extent to which the Court's preemption record is consistent with Merrill's hypothesis
is an intriguing question, but beyond the scope of this study.
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the preemption case universe roughly in half. Comparisons between
the FRC and SRC may help to detect shifts and changes in preemp-
tion law. 2
2
The trendline in Figure 1 indicates that preemption cases have de-
clined in frequency. The FRC decided 58 preemption cases, or slightly
over seven cases per term. The SRC decided 47 cases, slightly under
five cases per term. This drop mirrors the decline of the Rehnquist
Court's over-all docket and, more narrowly, its civil docket. For both
the FRC and the SRC, preemption cases constituted roughly eight
percent of the Court's civil docket.23
B. Subject Matter
We divided the case universe into seven subject-matter categories.
24
The number of cases in each group is shown in parentheses.
* Labor and Employment (32), including employment benefits
(other than safety regulations). This category contains a very
large number of ERISA cases.
" Economic Regulation (17), such as the (typically, industry-
specific) regulation of banking, insurance, and securities. The
category excludes
" Transportation and Infrastructure (15), which contains
industry-specific laws and regulations that govern network
industries, including telecommunications, railroads, elec-
tricity, airlines, and trucking.
* Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation (13) encom-
passes all laws administered by, and regulations issued by, fed-
eral administrative agencies that are entrusted primarily (or
exclusively) with the protection of public health and safety,
including the EPA, OSHA, the FDA, and NHTSA.
22 See, e.g., text at notes 42-44, infra.
23 Over its eight terms, the FRC decided 1,011 cases, 724 of them civil, by written
opinion. The SRC decided 823 total cases, 578 of them civil in its ten terms. Figures
for 1986-2002 Terms compiled from The Supreme Court, 1986-2002 Term, Harv L Rev
(November, annual in 17 volumes); 2003 Term calculations by the authors' count.
24 The commonly used United States Supreme Court Judicial Database codes
cases as either "preemption" (issue codes 910, 911) or as belonging to some substan-
tive issue or issue area. That coding is based on a legitimate and-certainly, for politi-
cal scientists-sensible interest in policies rather than legal distinctions. Harold J.
Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2002
Terms, Documentation 41 (last updated Nov. 25, 2003), online at http://www.polisci
.msu.edu/pljp/sctcode.pdf. Still, the procedure entails that "preemption" becomes a
residual and underinclusive category See Appendix B. The procedure adopted here-
identifies preemption cases first, and then group by issue-permits a more nuanced
analysis of preemption jurisprudence.
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* Public Benefits (8), meaning benefits such as Social Security,
Medicaid, and Veterans' Benefits.25
* Taxation (6), as distinct from regulation.
* Other Cases (14). This category contains five cases concern-
ing the preemptive force of the Federal Arbitration Act, four
cases dealing with Indian affairs, and five cases on a variety of
issues from government contracting to elections.
The last three categories are self-explanatory, and pose no classifi-
cation problems. The first four categories encompass the activities of
the regulatory state and, collectively, comprise three-quarters of Su-
preme Court preemption disputes during both the FRC and the SRC.
Table 1 shows the distribution.26
Table 1. Preemption Cases by Subject-Matter
FRC SRC TOTAL
Labor & Employment 22 10 32
Economic Regulation 8 9 17
Transportation & Infrastructure 6 9 15
Health, Safety, Environment 7 6 13
Subtotal Regulatory 43 34 77
Public Benefits 4 4 8
Taxation 5 1 6
Other 6 8 14
Subtotal Non-Regulatory 15 13 28
Total 58 47 105
25 Arguably, not all cases in this category are true preemption cases. When the in-
junction against state law flows from the state's acceptance of federal funds (e.g., un-
der Medicaid), the state can (at least in theory) evade "preemption" through the simple
expedient of not accepting the funds. An ordinary preemption case, of course, offers no
such escape. Nonetheless, the justices have characterized and analyzed such cases as
preemption cases, and we take their word for it. See, e.g., Pharm Research & Mfrs of
Am v Walsh, 538 US 644 (2002).
26 Distinctions are hard to draw in some individual cases. For example, some pre-
emption cases turn on near-metaphysical distinctions between state health care laws
that regulate "the business of insurance" and those that do not. The latter are pre-
empted under ERISA; the former survive preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. See, e.g., Ky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc v Miller, 538 US 329 (2002). It seems
equally plausible to lump those cases under "Economic Regulation" or "Labor and
Employment!' (We chose the latter option.) The vast majority of cases, however, could
easily be assigned to one or the other category.
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C. Torts
The preemption of state common law-as distinct from state or local
statutes-has become a particularly contentious issue both among
the justices and legal scholars." Corporate interests look to federal
preemption as a last line of defense against state courts and juries,
while states (and many legal scholars) lament preemption as an un-
warranted interference in an area of "traditional" state power. Land-
mark cases from Cippolone v. Liggett2t to Geier v. Honda Motor Com-
pany29 illustrate the salience of this question.
We identified 32 cases (out of 105) that deal with the federal pre-
emption of state common law claims. Since those claims almost al-
ways sound in tort, we called the cases "tort cases." The aggregate
count of tort cases arguably understates their significance, since all
but two of them fall into one of the four regulatory categories. 30 In
these areas, where the plaintiffs' bar meets the federal regulatory
state, tort cases comprise nearly 40 percent of the case universe, with
a slight relative increase for the SRC. Table 2 shows the rounded
percentage of tort cases in each category (total number of cases in
parentheses).
Table 2. Preemption of Tort Claims by Subject-Matter (Regulatory Cases)
FRC SRC TOTAL
Labor & Employment 45% (22) 30% (10) 41% (32)
Economic Regulation 25% (8) 33% (9) 29% (17)
Transportation & Infrastructure 17% (6) 55% (9) 40% (15)
Health, Safety, Environment 28% (7) 66% (6) 46% (13)
Total 35% (43) 44% (34) 39% (77)
Do tort cases differ in some systematic way from cases involving
the preemption of statutory law? A first glance at case outcomes sug-
gests an affirmative answer: 20 of the 32 tort cases, or 62.5 %, resulted
in a ruling for preemption, whereas only 47.9% of the 73 non-tort
cases (35) yielded that outcome. For the SRC, the difference widened
to a pro-preemption outcome in 67.6% of tort cases and only 45.0%
27 See note 7 and accompanying text, supra.
28 Cippolone v Liggett, 505 US 504 (1991).
29 Geier v Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861 (1999).
o The two remaining tort cases, classified as "Other," both arose under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 US 52 (1995); Green
Tree Fin Corp v Bazzle, 539 US 444 (2003).
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in non-tort cases. These numbers suggest a (perhaps increasing) judi-
cial hostility to state common law. That impression, however, is likely
unwarranted. With only two exceptions, tort cases do not involve
states as parties. We will argue below that the lack of state participa-
tion, rather than the nature of the state law claim (common law ver-
sus statutory), most likely explains the higher probability of preemp-
tion rulings in tort cases. 3'
D. Parties
We distinguish four types of parties in preemption disputes: "Fed-
eral" (meaning any branch, agency, or official of the federal govern-
ment); "State" (meaning any branch, agency, or official of a state
government, including local governments and their agents); "Busi-
ness" (any for-profit corporation or trade association of such enter-
prises); and other "Private" (including trade unions, Indian tribes,
or unaffiliated individuals, such as private plaintiffs in a state tort
action).
It is tempting to think of preemption cases as disputes "between
the feds and the states." But while that is true in an abstract legal
sense, it is grossly misleading as a matter of litigation economy and
case participation. Table 3(a) shows the frequency with which the
four categories of parties figured as plaintiffs and defendants in pre-
emption cases that eventually wound their way into the Rehnquist
Court. Table 3(b) performs the same operation for petitioners and re-
spondents. The shaded areas and bold numbers show the most com-
mon constellations of parties.32
The Tables show that the enforcement (or not) of federal preemp-
tion through litigation is, to a large extent, the work of business or
other private parties. For example:
Preemption cases are almost always initiated by a private
party. In an overwhelming number of cases (94 out of 105), a
business or other private party figured as the plaintiff. State
governments participated as an original party to a preemp-
tion dispute in just over half of all cases (54)-but typically as
31 See Part IV infra.
32 The aggregate numbers for the two most common party constellations (Non-
Government cases, and those between a state and a private party) in the Plaintiff/De-
fendant Table do not precisely match the numbers for the same constellations in the
Petitioner/Appellee Table. The discrepancy arises because we coded cases in accor-
dance with the principal plaintiff (defendant/petitioner/appellee), as identified in the
official caption of each case. In three cases, either the caption or the actual posture of
the case changed between its initiation and the Supreme Court's decision, in such a
way as to affect the classification.
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Table 3(a). Preemption Cases by Plaintiff and Defendant
Defendant
Plaintiff Business Private State Federal Total
1 56
32 9
Federal 0 1 1 0 2
Total 41 12 48 4 105
Table 3(b). Preemption Cases by Petitioner and Respondent
Respondent
Petitioner Business Private State Federal Total
0 53
1 19
34 31
Federal 0 0 2 0 2
Total 26 48 26 5 105
defendants. In only nine cases did a state agency initiate the
lawsuit.33
In cases in which the Rehnquist Court granted certiorari and
reached a decision on the merits, business petitions (53) far
outnumber state petitions (31). Petitions by non-governmental
parties (i.e., "Private" and "Business" combined) constitute al-
most 70 percent of the case universe. A mere six cases (out of
105) involved both the federal and a state government as par-
ties. Conversely, 50 cases involved exclusively private parties.
33 Curiously, eight of those cases were decided by the FRC. With this one exception,
the pattern shows little change between the FRC and the SRC. For that reason (and be-
cause the numbers become too small for meaningful statistical comparison), FRC and
SRC numbers are not displayed here.
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The prominent role of private litigants will prove crucial to an un-
derstanding of case outcomes. As shown in Part IV, party constella-
tions have a significant effect on preemption case outcomes. All else
equal, rulings against preemption are much more likely in cases to
which the state is a party than in Non-Government cases.
E. Outcomes and Votes: A Note on "Mixed" Cases
We coded the outcome in each preemption case, and each justice's vote
in each case, as an outcome or vote for or against preemption. A few
cases, and a larger number of judicial votes and opinions, defied such
easy classification-typically, because the Supreme Court held a state
law, court judgment, or cause of action to be "partially" preempted. In
a few of these "mixed" cases, it proved possible to determine whether
the Court's ruling was predominantly (non-) preemptive, and we coded
those cases accordingly. Case-by-case examination yielded an unam-
biguous outcome in 99 of the 105 cases, leaving six cases whose out-
come could only be described as "mixed." In an additional five cases,
a minority of justices submitted a "mixed" opinion. In coding these
observations, we scored each case or vote as two separate observa-
tions and, for statistical purposes, weighted each observation at 50%.
Appendix C describes our method and our reasons for adopting it.
The "mixed" cases differ from the preemption universe in two
salient respects. First, while fewer than one-third of the Rehnquist
Court's preemption cases have involved state common law claims
rather than statutes, four of the six mixed cases, and six of the eleven
cases in which any justice submitted a mixed vote, involve the federal
preemption of state common law and especially tort law.3 4 Second,
the Rehnquist Court's preemption decisions show a high degree of
consensus: fully 54 of the 105 cases, or over half, were unanimous de-
cisions. The cases with "mixed" votes or verdicts, in contrast, sparked
far more disagreement among the justices. Six of the eleven cases, in-
cluding two of the cases involving the preemption of common law
claims, were contested. This pattern explains scholars' view of state
common law preemption as an unsettled frontier of preemption law.
The danger lies in mistaking the contested frontier for the consider-
ably more pacific hinterland.
-4 In addition to Cippolone, 505 US 504 (1992), the following three cases involving
the preemption of state common law produced "mixed" outcomes: International Pa-
per Co v Ouelette, 479 US 481 (1987); CSX Transp, Inc v Easterwood, 507 US 658
(1993); and American Airlines, Inc v Wolens, 513 US 219 (1995). The additional state
common law preemption cases that produced mixed opinions by a minority of justices
are Medtronic v Loh, 518 US 470 (1995) and El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tsui Yuan
Tseng, 525 US 155 (1999).
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F. Conflict and Consensus
As just noted, over half of the Rehnquist Court's decisions (54 of 105)
have been unanimous. This level of consensus is higher than the gen-
eral degree of unanimity on the Rehnquist Court, which is 40.3 % for
all cases. 35 The ratio has remained roughly constant: 29 of the FRC's
58 preemption cases (50.0%) were unanimous, and 25 of the SRC's 47
preemption decisions (53.2%) fit that description.
A strict definition of unanimity arguably overstates the level of ju-
dicial conflict especially in preemption cases, where individual jus-
tices sometimes hold idiosyncratic views on a particular question or
statute.36 For a more nuanced assessment, we categorized outcomes as
"consensual" or "contested," depending on the vote differential. "Con-
sensual" cases are those with a vote differential of four or above-or,
put differently, with no more than two dissenting votes (e.g., 6-2 or 7-2).
"Contested" cases are those with a vote differential of 3 or below
(e.g., 6-3). By that measure, one in four preemption cases proved con-
tested. Table 4(a) shows the distribution. In addition, the mixed cases
yielded nine (near-) unanimous verdicts on a preemption question
presented in those cases (five for the FRC, and four for the SRC). The
weighted distribution is shown in Table 4(b).
Table 4(a). Judicial Conflict and Consensus in Preemption Cases (unweighted)
Consensual
Unanimous 1-2 Dissents Subtotal Contested Total
FRC 29 15 44 14 58
SRC 25 11 36 11 47
Total 54 26 80 25 105
35 Figures for 1986-2002 Terms compiled from "Table I (C)-Unanimity/" The Su-
preme Court, 1986-2002 Term, Harv L Rev (November, annual in 17 volumes); 2003
Term calculations: authors' count.
36 For example, Justice Thomas, alone among all justices, has consistently argued
that the Federal Arbitration Act lacks preemptive force. See Doctors Associates, Inc v.
Casarotto, 517 US 681, 689 (1996); Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 US
52, 64 (1995). Justice Stevens and Justice Souter also sometimes dissent from other-
wise unanimous rulings for preemption. Justice Stevens has written five such dissents;
Justice Souter, one. Engine Mfrs Ass'n v So Coast Air Quality Mgmt Dist, 541 US 246
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting). We have found only one lone dissent from an otherwise
unanimous ruling against preemption: Nixon v Missouri Municipal League, 541 US
125 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Table 4(b). Judicial Conflict and Consensus in Preemption Cases (weighted)
Consensual
Unanimous 1-2 Dissents Subtotal Contested Total
FRC 30.5 16 46.5 11.5 58
SRC 25 13 38 9 47
Total 55.5 29 84.5 20.5 105
G. Outcomes
Table 5 shows the weighted conditional probabilities of pro-
preemption outcomes, broken down by period (FRC/SRC) and level
of dissension (consensual/contested). The number of cases is given in
parentheses.
Table 5. Probabilities of Pro-Preemption Ruling by Level of Dissension
Consensual Contested Total
FRC .51 (46.5) .57(11.5) .52(58)
SRC .51 (38) .61 (9) .53 (47)
Total .51 (84.5) .59 (20.5) .52 (105)
Two observations leap out. First, preemption litigation in the Su-
preme Court has proven by and large a fifty-fifty proposition in both
periods.37 Preemption outcomes are slightly more probable in con-
tested cases, although the number of cases is too small to attach
much significance to this finding. Second, the picture strongly sug-
gests continuity rather than change. In particular, and perhaps con-
trary to perceptions of the Court's increased solicitude for "states'
rights," the Rehnquist Court does not appear to have become more
hostile to federal preemption, at least not by a measure of case out-
comes.
That simple measure, of course, may mask important differences
in (for example) the selection of cases or the effect of particular rul-
37 This finding is broadly consistent with earlier empirical assessments. E.g.
O'Brien, 23 Publius at 22 (Table 3) (cited in note 1).
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ings. 3s Most important, preemption cases may be path-dependent,
especially when they involve the same statute time and again.39 With
all appropriate caution, though, the picture suggests the following
inference: In periods of dramatic legal change, the composition of
case outcomes (here, for or against preemption) should be expected
to change. A Supreme Court majority with the will and cohesion to
work legal change will want to do so in a series of cases, and it will
find the means to select suitable cases for review.40 Preemption
cases reflect no such pattern. To the extent that preemption law has
changed, that change has been subterranean, or a game of inches-
and perhaps both.
III. WHAT ROLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT?
Preemption cases centrally implicate the institutional role of the Su-
preme Court, both with respect to federal-state relations and vis-a-vis
the Congress. For example, do the justices think of their role as guard-
ians and enforcers of federal supremacy? As protectors of a federal-
state "balance"? Without pretensions to analytical rigor, one can in-
tuitively distinguish three conceptions of the Supreme Court's role in
preemption cases: a "supremacy" conception; an "error correction"
conception; and a "federalism" conception. The pattern of Supreme
Court reversals or affirmances of lower-court decisions provide indi-
rect-and, as we shall see, inconclusive-evidence on the Supreme
Court's adherence to one or another of these ideal types.
The supremacy conception would have the Supreme Court act as
a guardian and enforcer of federal and especially congressional su-
38 "Selection" here means case selection by the Supreme Court through the certio-
rari process. In this discretionary and strategic context, theories that model the selec-
tion of cases by litigants (see, e.g., George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984)) cannot be used to predict litigation
outcomes (although they may well apply to parties decisions to file certiorari petitions).
39 Suppose that business interests and state governments contest the scope of a fed-
eral preemption statute in a series of cases, each with a fifty-fifty record of success.
(The continuous litigation over federal preemption under ERISA is an example.) Let
the Supreme Court, in the next case involving the statute, substantially increase (or
decrease) the preemptive scope of the statute: states will legislate around that new in-
terpretation, and parties will again litigate over its precise meaning. A new series of
cases may again produce fifty-fifty results, but one cannot infer that preemption law
has remained stable.
40 The Rehnquist Court's decisions on the states' sovereign immunity in the wake
of Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44 (1997), are an example: here, the
Court decided in the states' favor in a quick succession of cases. See Michael E. Solim-
ine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, 101 Mich L Rev 1463, 1488-91 (2003) (Appendix listing cases).
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premacy. If so, one should expect that the Court would dispropor-
tionately review, and disproportionately reverse, lower-court deci-
sions against preemption. (Why grant certiorari n a case where lower
courts have already enforced federal supremacy?) Further, one might
suspect that the Supreme Court would disproportionately reverse anti-
preemption rulings by state courts, which may have a higher propen-
sity than federal courts to slight federal prerogatives.
A second conception would have the Supreme Court act as a kind
of error correction agency in preemption cases (though not necessar-
ily as a general proposition). Preemption analysis is essentially a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation. Assuming Congress had the constitu-
tional authority to legislate, the only question is whether and to what
extent Congress meant to preempt state and local law. To the extent
possible, the Court should go about that task without interpretive
presumptions that bias the result for or against Congress.4' One em-
inently plausible presumption, however, is that Congress would want
the preemptive scope and effect of its enactments to be both clear and
uniform. This presumption counsels judicial aggressiveness in elim-
inating lower-court "splits" and erroneous rulings. On this view, one
should expect a high reversal rate, with no necessary bias in a pro- or
anti-preemption direction.
Under the third, federalism conception, the Court's "nationalist"
impulse to safeguard federal supremacy-and perhaps its error-
correction function-will be tempered by a concern for states' rights.
It is difficult to decide how these conflicting presumptions should
shake out in the general balance of outcomes. It stands to reason,
though, that the states' rights perspective should have gained strength
over time, in tandem with the Court's over-all federalism jurispru-
dence and its changed composition.
In an effort to obtain (albeit indirect) evidence on the Court's view
of its role, we determined whether preemption cases arrived at the
Supreme Court from a state court (usually a state supreme court) or
a federal court. In addition, we determined whether the Supreme
Court affirmed or reversed the lower court's ruling. Both variables
suggest a pronounced shift in the Supreme Court's preoccupation.
Those shifts, however, do not clearly support or refute any of our three
stylized conceptions. Moreover, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the ob-
served changes in direction roughly coincide with the transition from
the FRC to the SRC: the trendlines begin to diverge in the 1994 and
41 See Viet Dinh, 88 Georgetown L J at 2087-88 (cited in note 1). On the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia is the most insistent advocate of this position See, e.g., Cippolone
v Liggett, 505 US 504, 544 (1992) (Scalia, J., diss.).
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1995 Terms. We cannot think of any obvious explanation of why this
should be so.
The Rehnquist Court granted certiorari to state courts in 40 cases
and to lower federal courts, in 65 cases. This mix differs substantially
from the composition of all civil cases decided by the Rehnquist
1998 2000
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Court: upwards of 84% of those cases have come from federal rather
than state courts. 42 On this dimension, moreover, preemption cases
show a striking difference between the FRC and the SRC. The FRC
granted an almost equal number of certioraris to state courts (28) and
federal courts (30). The Second Rehnquist Court, in contrast, has fo-
cused its attention on federal courts: 35 cert grants to federal courts,
and only 12 to state courts.
A similarly intriguing shift is observable in the reversal/ affirmance
pattern. Overall, the Rehnquist Court reversed lower-court decisions
in 63 cases and affirmed in 37. In the remaining five cases, the Su-
preme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, with respect to dif-
ferent and separable preemption claims on which either the Supreme
Court or the court below rendered a "mixed" verdict.4 This ratio of
roughly six reversals for every four affirmances is virtually identical
to the Court's reversal rate for all cases over the period under consid-
eration.44 Again, though, the data suggest a marked shift: a near-
balance (29:27, with two split reversal/affirmance decisions) in the
FRC, and a ratio of over 3:1 (34 reversals versus 10 affirmances, with
three splits) for the SRC.
Closer inspection reveals a yet more perplexing picture. Table 6(a)
shows the weighted conditional probabilities of affirmance, depend-
ing on whether the case (i) came from a state or federal court and (ii)
was decided for or against preemption by the court below. Table 6(b)
contains the same information, but distinguishes between FRC and
SRC. The most striking aspect is the sharply lower affirmance rate for
state courts during the SRC, regardless of the direction of the lower
court's decision.
To what extent does the evidence support one of the three concep-
tions of the Supreme Court's role in preemption cases? Looking at
Table 6(b), the Rehnquist Court reviewed a much larger number of
state court decisions against preemption (28) than state court deci-
42 During the FRC, 118 (or 16%) of 724 civil cases came from state courts. During
the SRC, the numbers dropped to 63 (11%) of 578 civil cases. For the entire duration of
the Rehnquist Court, the numbers work out to 181 (14%) of 1302 civil cases. Figures
for 1986-2002 Terms compiled from The Supreme Court, 1986-2002 Term, Harv L Rev
(November, annual in 17 volumes); 2003 Term calculations: authors' count.
"I In coding these decisions, we proceeded as we did with the "mixed" cases: we
coded the reversed and affirmed portions as separate observations and weighted each
at fifty percent. The five cases are Cippolone v Liggett, 505 US 504 (1992); Treasury
Dept v Fabe, 508 US 491 (1993); American Airlines v Wolens, 513 US 219 (1995);
Medtronic v Lohr, 518 US 470 (1996); and UNUM v Ward, 526 US 358 (1999).
" Lee Epstein, et al, eds, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions and
Developments at 228-229 (Cong Quart 3d ed, 2002) (showing reversal rate of 59% over
the 1986-2001 period). As a subgroup, states and territories fared little better, with a
61.5% reversal rate before the Court. Id at 710-711.
62 Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment
Table 6(a). Probabilities of Affirmance, Depending on Lower Court Disposition
Lower Court Pro-Preemption Lower Court Anti-Preemption
State Court .33(12) .45 (28)
Federal Court .41 (34.5) .30 (30.5)
Table 6(b). Probabilities of Affirmance, Depending on Lower Court Disposition-
FRC and SRC
FRC SRC
Lower Court Lower Court
Pro-P Anti-P Pro-P Anti-P
State Court .50(6) .55 (22) .17 (6) .08(6)
Federal Court .51 (19.5) .33 (10.5) .28 (15) .27(20)
sions for preemption (12). In cases from federal courts, in contrast,
lower court decisions for preemption outnumber those against (34.5
to 30.5). This observation may lend modest support to the supremacy
conception. On the other hand, Table 6(a) shows that state courts
were more likely to be affirmed in cases where they had ruled against
preemption (.45 affirmance, versus .33 affirmance in decisions for
preemption). This observation, plus perhaps the larger number of fed-
eral court decisions under review, would seem to cut in the opposite
direction.
Overall, cases over lower court rulings against preemption out-
number reviews of lower court decisions for preemption (58.5 ver-
sus 46.5), lending modest support to a supremacy view. Then again,
the conditional probabilities of affirmance are comparable for lower-
court rulings for and against preemption. Sustained adherence to a
supremacy conception should produce a higher number of reversals
in cases where lower courts found no preemption.
Table 6(b) provides one piece of evidence for a federalism concep-
tion-to wit, the Rehnquist Court's increased propensity to review
preemption ruling by federal rather than state courts. The Court re-
viewed a roughly equal number of federal appellate decisions in both
periods. It also reviewed six state court decisions in favor of preemp-
tion in each period. In sharp contrast, reviews of state court decisions
against preemption dropped from 22 to six. One could say that these
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cases account for more than the entire drop in volume between the
FRC (58 preemption cases) and the SRC (47). The evidence is equally
supportive, however, of a marked shift towards an error-correction
view. The SRC found only 1.5 cases (out of twelve) in which a state
court had gotten it "right," and even the federal courts had better than
.7 probability of being reversed-regardless of whether they ruled for
or against preemption.
The observed shifts between the FRC's and the SRC's certiorari
patterns seem too substantial to be a fluke. Naturally, we have toyed
with possible explanations-in particular, Thomas Merrill's sugges-
tion that the high predictability of judicial votes on a Supreme Court
with stable personnel will shape judicial behavior and case out-
comes.45 That hypothesis might help to explain some of the observed
shifts, such as the higher reversal rate under the SRC: if "error cor-
rection" is a basic function of (preemption) review, then the reversal
rate should rise as the justices get better at predicting what all the
other justices will view as an error.
Answering these questions would require systematic information
on the supply of preemption cases, for the obvious reason that the
pronounced shifts just described may reflect either a changed cert pool
or a different set of choices from that pool (or both). Certiorari petitions
may have shifted from state to federal courts for a variety of reasons.
Similarly, preemption law may be an arena of increased circuit court
splits and dissents, which might explain a shift to certiorari grants
to federal courts even if the proportion of petitions from state and fed-
eral courts held constant. We have collected much of that information
but decline to present it here because the coding and analysis pose dif-
ficult problems that merit a full discussion in a separate article.46
Given these limitations, we must be satisfied to observe that the
change in the pattern of certiorari grants has not translated into a
change in the Supreme Court's direction with respect to preemption
outcomes. A significant shift in a pro- or anti-preemption direction
should produce a string of decisions in that direction and a dispro-
portionate number of reversals of lower court decisions in the oppo-
45 See note 21, supra.
For a ready example, while scholars agree (and the Supreme Court has consis-
tently stated) that circuit splits-and more broadly judicial dissension in the courts be-
low-is an important cue for certiorari grants, "splits" is not a dichotomous, yes-or-
no variable. Lawyers obtain ample compensation to distinguish or harmonize cases.
Especially in preemption cases, which often hang on highly nuanced differences among
statutory provisions, administrative regulations, or private claims, the "split" signal is
highly subject to strategic manipulation both by litigants and justices-and, conse-
quently, to coding and measurement error.
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site direction-until the lower courts take the hint. No such shift, how-
ever, is observable.
IV. EXPLAINING OUTCOMES
A. A Signaling Theory of Preemption
In examining the variables that may explain the outcomes of Supreme
Court preemption decisions, we follow scholars who have argued that
the Supreme Court relies on signals or "cues," such as the identity of
the parties. What gives signaling theory its plausibility is the insight
that the Supreme Court must economize on information. That recog-
nition applies to merits as well as certiorari decisions, 47 and it applies
with particular force in the context of statutory preemption. First,
preemption cases are a steady diet, which implies a premium on not
having to think through each case from scratch. Second, the general
heading of "preemption" encompasses a broad range of disparate
cases involving tobacco advertising, automobile safety, medical de-
vices, telecommunications pricing, outboard motors, and HMOs.
The cases involve tangled regulatory schemes, whose political dynam-
ics and economic consequences-it is safe to say-are usually a mys-
tery to the justices. Since life is short, a sensible justice will attempt
to reduce the complexity-inter alia, by relying on signals. Third,
preemption cases pose a high risk of gamesmanship. When the ACLU
pushes a First Amendment claim or the NAACP defends a civil
rights law, what the Court sees is what it gets. In preemption cases,
in contrast, solemn arguments about the sanctity of "our federal-
ism" or "federal supremacy" are often proffered by business or trial
lawyers. These parties' federalism arguments are bound to be stra-
tegic, and their alarms will often be false. That consideration, too,
might induce a rational judge to look to more reliable signals. We con-
centrate on the identity of the parties as "signals" and examine four
hypotheses:
41 Cue theory has been developed, in increasingly sophisticated game-theoretic vari-
ations, primarily in the context of the certiorari process. See, e.g., Gregory Caldeira and
John Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82:4
Am Pol Sci Rev 1109 (1988); H. W Perry, Jr. Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the
United States Supreme Court (Harvard, 1991); Charles E. Cameron, et al, Strategic
Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's
Certiorari Decisions, 94:1 Am Pol Sci Rev 101 (Mar2000). However, at least one scholar
has fruitfully applied an informal signaling theory to Supreme Court merits decisions
in dormant Commerce Clause cases (which, as a species of federal common law pre-
emption, bears affinity to statutory preemption and especially "implied" preemption):
Christopher Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 S Ct Econ Rev 233 (1999).
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" State Parties. A state's complaint about unwarranted federal
interference is substantially more authentic and credible than
a private party's averment to the same effect. 48 Hence, rulings
against preemption will be more likely in cases to which a
state is a party than in "Non-Government" cases-that is,
cases among private parties.
" State Amici. In "Non-Government" cases, the presence of
state amici should serve to validate federalism arguments
and render rulings against preemption more likely.
49
" The Solicitor General. Empirical studies have consistently
found that the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") "en-
joys a unique degree of success as an amicus filer."' o We hy-
pothesize that the OSG should play a particularly salient
role in preemption cases. Those cases turn on the interpreta-
tion of federal statutes and agency regulations, where the fed-
eral government possesses both special expertise and a high
stake in the outcome. Perhaps more interestingly, we predict
that the OSG "signal" will be asymmetric. By virtue of its in-
stitutional position, the OSG is expected to defend federal
prerogatives. An OSG position for preemption, in other words,
is a kind of default position that conveys little (if any) addi-
tional information. In contrast, if the OSG disclaims preemp-
tion, its position should carry great weight with the Justices.
* OSG Partisan Affiliation. We hypothesize that the Supreme
Court will view Republican OSGs as more business-friendly,
and therefore more supportive of preemption, than Democra-
tic OSGs. Therefore, the effects of the OSG's position for or
against preemption should be more strongly asymmetric for
Republican than for Democratic OSGs.
This Part first presents the descriptive statistics on the effects of
state participation, state amicus briefs, and the OSG's participation
and partisan affiliation. We then present a simple regression analysis,
which shows that the effects of state party participation and OSG
participation are sizeable and statistically significant. The evidence
on state amicus briefs is more mixed: while correlations suggest that
'8 Cf. Drahozal, 7 S Ct Econ Rev 233 (cited in note 47) (showing that dormant Com-
merce Clause claims by state parties are more successful than complaints by private
parties and attributing the phenomenon to the greater authenticity and credibility of
federalism complaints by state parties).
11 While the evidence on the effectiveness of (state) amicus briefs is mixed, the au-
thors of the most extensive and sophisticated study have identified some such effects:
Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U Pa L Rev 743 (2000).
-0 Id at 774.
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such briefs may have the desired effect of making rulings in favor of
preemption less likely, that effect appears to be neither large nor sta-
tistically significant. The same is true of the OSG's Partisan Affilia-
tion: intriguing correlations, but no statistical significance. Nor could
we find any other variable with a statistically significant effect on
preemption case outcomes. The Part concludes with a brief sugges-
tion for further research.
B. State Parties
Preemption cases typically take one of two forms:
" State Participation: A business or other private party sues a
state government. The private plaintiff wields preemption as
a sword against the state, and a pro-preemption ruling trans-
lates into a loss for the state. This characterization also ap-
plies to the rare cases (five) in which a state government ini-
tiates a suit against a private party.
" Non-Government: A private party (such as a tort plaintiff)
sues another private party (typically, a business). Here, defen-
dants wield preemption as a shield against private state law
claims. A ruling for preemption in a case brought by private
plaintiffs translates into a win for business. No state partici-
pates directly in the litigation, but one might say that a pro-
preemption outcome translates into an incidental or collat-
eral loss to the state.
In the form in which the cases appeared before the Court-that is,
as counted by "petitioners" and "respondents"-the Rehnquist Court
has decided 45 "State Party" cases and 50 "Non-Government" cases,
accounting for all but ten of all 105 preemption cases.51 Three of
those ten cases involved disputes between state and local govern-
ments; in the remaining seven, the federal government was a party.
Because these atypical cases are irrelevant to our analysis, 5 2 we omit
them from the descriptive statistics (unless noted otherwise).
Table 7 shows the weighted conditional probabilities of an out-
come for preemption (number of cases in parentheses). Put simply,
preemption outcomes are much more likely in Non-Government
cases than in cases in which a state participates. That tendency is
more pronounced for the SRC than for the FRC.
-1 See Table 3(b), supra.
52 A case in which state agencies appear on both sides of the dispute is unhelpful in
determining whether the presence of a state party is a signal for the Court. The seven
cases to which the federal government was a party are unhelpful because the feds' pres-
ence may mute any other signal.
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Table 7. Probabilities of Preemption, by Party Constellation
FRC SRC Total
State Participation .44 (25) .35 (20) .40 (45)
Non-Government .57 (27) .70 (23) .63 (50)
Further evidence emerges by comparing states to other parties in
their respective roles as petitioners and respondents. Recall that the
reversal rate-that is to say, the rate at which petitioners prevail-is
about 61% for the Rehnquist Court, both for preemption cases and
for all cases.5 3 Table 8 below shows the parties' "unexpected success
ratios" in cases against one another-that is to say, the difference
between the expected success rate (61%) and the parties' actual rec-
ord.5 4 Horizontally, a positive number means that the petitioner did
that much better in preemption cases than the "average" petitioner.
Read vertically, a positive number means that the respondent did that
much worse than the average respondent.
While the exercise involves uncomfortably small numbers of ob-
servations (in parentheses), it holds an interesting suggestion. Busi-
ness seems to do okay against Private Parties, but it cannot seem to
catch a break against the States, regardless of its role as petitioner or
11 See note 44 and accompanying text, supra. The precise reversal rate for preemp-
tion cases is 62.3 %, but that miniscule difference does not affect the results here.
14 We have adapted this useful analytical device from Kearney and Merrill, 148 U Pa
L Rev at 788 (cited in note 49). Table (8) does not display the "Business versus Business"
cases (six) and the "Private versus Private" cases (eight) because we cannot tell, without
case-by-case examination, whether the cases were brought by a pro- or anti-preemption
party. Hence, we cannot calculate success ratios. Strikingly, though, eleven of the four-
teen "intra-group" disputes resulted in a finding for preemption. While that may be a
coincidence or an artifact of small numbers, it might on closer inspection constitute a
piece of evidence in support of a signaling theory. In cases among different parties, the
participants' identity and the constellation carry informational content. For example,
when a Private party asks for certiorari in a case against Business, every justice readily
grasps the social and ideological dimension (e.g., trial bar versus corporate America)
and the crucial role of statutory preemption in policing the divide. Intra-group cases
provide no such signal. All the Court sees is a boring private quarrel of the sort that it
must sometimes decide-but whose appearance on the docket it would rather mini-
mize (so as to make room for cases that the justices deem more interesting and im-
portant). In that setting, preemption may look like a conflict-minimizing rule. More
precisely: preemption may always hold attraction as a conflict-minimizing rule. But
while that attraction is in other cases tempered by countervailing considerations (for
example, a concern that an excessively preemption-friendly jurisprudence might tram-
ple on states' rights or unduly advantage corporate America), those considerations to
some extent depend on an antecedent party signal. When that signal is missing, the
goal of conflict minimization gains the upper hand. To repeat: this train of thought is
no more than an intriguing possibility. But it may merit further investigation.
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Table 8. Petitioners' Unexpected Success Ratios
Respondent
Petitioner Business Private State Total
Business * -. 04 (30) -. 14 (17) -.08 (47)
Private -. 19 J6) . .15 J4) .04(10)
State .18(14) -. 21 )10) ... .10(24)
Total .06(20) -. 08(40) -. 09(21) (81)
respondent. Private parties figure too rarely as petitioners to put any
confidence in the numbers, but they emerge (somewhat surprisingly)
unscathed: in fact, they appear to do a bit better than the "average"
party, both on the petitioner and the respondent side. The States do
well against Business, and surprisingly poorly against Private Parties.
Contrary to suggestions that pro-preemption decisions are a kind
of pro-business concession by otherwise federalism-minded justices,5
Table 8 actually suggests an anti-business story. Liberal justices, that
story goes (in the vernacular), dislike big business to begin with. Con-
servative justices do not share that antipathy. But neither do they view
it as part of their job description to bail out corporate America, when
a decent respect for federalism appears to command the opposite re-
sult. And so-the story concludes-when states insist upon their
right to regulate business over and above a federal baseline, the Court
will often give them their due.
5 6
The fact remains that pro-preemption outcomes are substantially
less likely in State Participation than in Non-Government Cases,
which suggests that the presence of a state party serves as a signal.5 7
It is possible that State Participation is an independent signal (and
that the states' poor record against Private parties is a statistical fluke,
caused by the small number of such cases). It is also possible that
State Participation is (in a manner of speaking) the flipside of, or in-
terdependent with, a Business Participation signal. The evidence ap-
pears to permit either explanation.
5- See, e.g., Baybeck and Lowery, 30:3 Publius 73 (cited in note 1).
56 An anti-business story is also consistent with the striking frequency of pro-
preemption findings in Business v. Business and Private v. Private disputes, where that
reflex (due to the party constellation) does not come into play. See note 54, supra.
s It is possible that the quality of anti-preemption advocacy is higher for states
(who are repeat players in the Supreme Court) than for private plaintiffs' lawyers (most
of whom are not). But that explanation seems inconsistent with the perfectly re-
spectable batting average of Private Parties.
Michael S. Greve and Jonathan Klick 69
C. State Amici
1. Filing Pattern
We find extensive and still-growing state amicus participation in pre-
emption cases-predictably, almost exclusively on the anti-preemption
side."s States participated as amici in 64 of the 105 cases, or 60.9%. s 9
The rate of state participation increased from 58.6% of cases (34 in
58) for the FRC to 63.8% (32 in 47) for the SRC. State amicus briefs
are typically joined by more than one state. Of the 64 cases in
which any state participated as an amicus, fully 48 cases featured
"mass briefs" with twelve or more signatories against preemption,
including 15 cases in which 22 or more states participated. By these
measures, too, state amicus participation has increased. Mass briefs
were filed in 22 (37.9%) of preemption cases during the FRC; that
figure increased to 26 (55.3 %) for the SRC. Table 9 shows the distri-
bution.
Table 9. State Amicus Participation in Preemption Cases
FRC SRC Total
No State Amicus 24 17 41
Some State Amici Single State 4 2 6 16
2-11 States 8 2 10
Mass State Amici 12-21 States 17 16 33 48
22+ States 5 10 15
Table 10 shows the likelihood of a state amicus appearance for the
major party constellations, depending on the parties' appearance as
petitioner or respondent (total number of cases in parentheses).
While "only" 52% of Non-Government preemption cases feature a
state amicus, state amici participated in 71% of State-Party cases. It
58 We found only one case (Hillside Dairy v Kadish, 5 US 605 (2002)) where state
amici favored preemption. In four cases, state amici were split (number of state amici
for and against preemption in parentheses): Wisconsin Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US
597 (1990) (6/11); Hawaiian Airlines v Norris, 512 US 246 (1994) (1/14); Smiley v
Citibank, 517 US 735 (1995) (14/26); and Norfolk Southern Ry v Shanklin, 529 US 344
(1999) (5/12).
59 We report exclusively amicus participation by states as states. These numbers
understate the extent of state participation because they exclude participation by lo-
cal government agencies, state-level associations entrusted with public functions, and
intergovernmental organizations (such as the National Association of Governors). We
have collected but not yet analyzed that data.
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appears, moreover, that states prefer to submit amicus briefs for peti-
tioners, rather than respondents. 60 When a sister state or a Private lit-
igant presses an anti-preemption position against a Business respon-
dent, states participate as amici in roughly nine out of ten cases.
Conversely, when business petitioners insist on preemption, states
will lend amicus support "only" in half of all cases-regardless of
whether the respondent is one of their own, or a Private Party
Table 10. State Amicus Participation Rates
Respondent
Petitioner Business Private State Total
Business .50 (6) .50(30) .59 (17) .53 (53)
Private .83 (6) .38 (8) .50 (4) .55 (18)
State .93(14) .70(10) -. .83(24)
Total .81 (26) .52(48) .57(21) .61 (95)
Scholars have argued that amicus briefs may serve the strategic ob-
jective of manipulating the signals for the Supreme Court.61 From
that vantage (and for that matter from any outcome-oriented perspec-
tive), the states' pattern of amicus participation in preemption cases
looks suboptimal. First, one would expect the state "signal" to be more
robust in Non-Government cases. In State-Party cases, state amici
cannot send any signal that the Court has not already received from the
party-state; they can at most heighten the intensity of that signal.
62
In Non-Government cases, in contrast, state amici could authenti-
cate the "federalism" position urged by the anti-preemption party,
which might otherwise look opportunistic. The optimal strategy,
then, would concentrate state amicus efforts on Non-Government
cases. The observed pattern is the opposite. Second, Kearney's and
Merrill's study of amicus participation in Supreme Court merits de-
cisions from 1946 to 1995 shows state amici have a statistically sig-
60 This finding is impressively confirmed by the data-not presented here-on the
number of state amici and the frequency of mass briefs.
61 Caldeira and Wright, 82:4 Am Pol Sci Rev 109 (cited in note 27); Lee Epstein,
Courts and Interest Groups, in John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson, eds, The Amer-
ican Courts: A Critical Assessment 335 (Cong Q, 1991); and Cameron et al, 94:1 Am
Pol Sci Rev 101, 103 (cited in note 47).
62 Of course, state amici may (and often do) submit information that the litigating
state, due to page limitations or other reasons, cannot fully brief. But that is also true
of state amicus briefs in Non-Government cases.
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nificant effect on outcomes when they participate on behalf of re-
spondents, whereas no such effect could be shown for state amicus
participation on behalf of petitioners. 63 If that is right, the states' pref-
erence for assisting petitioners rather than respondents in preemp-
tion cases again seems suboptimal.
At first impression, inefficient signaling casts doubt on the hy-
pothesized signal: if the signal were worth something, parties would
surely invest resources in getting it "right." Their failure to do so sug-
gests that state amicus briefs (as other amicus briefs) principally serve
the filers' organizational needs, as opposed to outcome-oriented ob-
jectives. That is a possible explanation-but not the only possible ex-
planation. We will return to the question below, after examining the
evidence. 64
2. Outcomes
Table 11 shows the weighted conditional probabilities of a ruling
against preemption-that is to say, the states' success ratio-for pre-
emption cases, disaggregated into Non-Government cases and State
Party cases and, further, into cases without state amici, some state am-
ici, and "mass briefs." The numbers of cases appear in parentheses. 65
Table 11. State Amici and Anti-Preemption Outcomes
All Cases State Party Non-Government
No State Amicus .36(37) .43(14) .33(23)
Some State Amici .31 (13) .40(5) .25 (8)
Mass State Amici .62 (40) .69 (26) .41 (14)
All Cases .47 (90) .58 )45) .37(45)
State Particip. Rate 59% 69% 49%
As already noted, rulings against preemption are more likely in
cases to which a state is a party. It also appears that mass state ami-
cus participation has a positive effect on state success in preemption
litigation, whereas participation by only a few states does not. (To the
limited extent that the small numbers permit any conclusion, briefs
63 Kearney and Merrill, 148 U Pa L Rev at 749, 810-11 (cited in note 49).
64 See notes 79-83 and accompanying text, infra.
65 For purposes at hand, we have removed not only the state-versus-state cases and
the cases with a federal party but also, and for obvious reasons, the cases in which some
states favored preemption (see notes 52 and 58, along with accompanying text, supra).
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by a small number of state amici appear to make an anti-preemption
outcome less likely.) Consistent with a signaling theory, the number
of signatories may serve as a kind of proxy for the intensity of state
concern.66 In contrast, the correlations provide no evidence for our
expectation that state amicus participation should be more effective
in Non-Government cases than in State Party cases (where the "states'
rights" signal will often be redundant). While we cannot reject that
hypothesis outright, 67 the correlations suggest that state mass briefs
are more effective in State Party than in Non-Government cases. One
possible explanation is that mass state participation, contrary to our
earlier suggestion, signals not only the intensity of state concern but
also the authenticity of the states' position. Mass briefs may suggest
that the proffered position reflects the views of the states as states-
in other words, a true federalism interest, as opposed to a parochial
and opportunistic interest in a particular outcome that may well dif-
fer from the interests of other states.
D. The Solicitor General
We predict that the effects of the OSG's position in preemption cases
will be strong; asymmetric, in the sense that an OSG amicus filing
against preemption will provide a stronger signal than a filing for pre-
emption; and more strongly asymmetric for Republican than for De-
mocratic OSGs. The data support all three predictions, though to
varying degrees.
The OSG submitted briefs in 80 of the 105 preemption cases de-
cided by the Rehnquist Court. Excluding, as we have all along, the
three state-to-state cases (which offer little insight into the matter)
and seven cases to which the federal government was a party (where
the OSG submitted a party rather than an amicus brief and ipso facto
took a pro-preemption position), the OSG participated in 73 of 95
cases (72.6%). We coded each OSG brief with respect to its preemp-
tion position.6 In addition, we recorded whether the OSG brief in
66 State amicus briefs may make a difference on account of their informational con-
tent (e.g., the presentation of economic or other empirical evidence) as well as their sig-
naling value. That hypothesis, though, fails to explain why mass state briefs should
have an effect over and above state amicus briefs with few signatories.
67 One specification of our regression suggests that state amicus briefs in Non-
Government (but not State Party) cases may affect outcomes. However, the numbers
are too small to put confidence in that result. The correlations shown supra suggest
that the amicus effect appears to be stronger in State Party cases.
68 As with case outcomes and judicial votes, briefs urging partial preemption were
coded as two separate observations, with each observation weighted at 50 percent.
Luckily (in light of the manifest interdependence problem), there were only three such
briefs: International Paper Co v Ouelette, 479 US 481 (1986); CSX Transport Inc v
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question was filed by a Solicitor serving a Democratic or Republican
administration. Table 12 shows the distribution.
Table 12. OSG Amicus Preemption Briefs
State Party (48) Non-Government (47) All (95)
R D R D R D
Pro-P 47% (14.5) 25% (4) 41% (11) 45% (9.5) 44% (25.5) 36% (13.5)
Anti-P 37% (11.5) 56% (9) 19% (5) 40% (8.5) 28% (16.5) 47% (17.5)
Abstention 16%(5) 19%(3) 41% (11) 14% (3) 28%(16) 16%(6)
Total 31 16 27 21 58 37
The OSG has taken a pro-preemption position in 39 of 95 preemp-
tion cases, or about 40 percent-a figure that, in light of the Office's
institutional role, strikes us as remarkably low. As expected, 69 Demo-
cratic OSGs appear more willing than Republican OSGs to take an
anti-preemption position, both in State Party and Non-Government
cases. Republican OSGs have a higher propensity to abstain in Non-
Government cases (but not in State Party cases). Republican OSGs
sat out eleven of 26 such cases; Democrat OSGs, only 3 of 21.70
Does it matter? Table 13 below shows the weighted conditional
probabilities for pro-preemption outcomes. In interpreting the num-
bers, note that the OSG's success ratio for cases decided 'Against Pre-
emption" is the obverse of the probability of a pro-preemption out-
come (the number shown). Overall, the OSG has a "batting average"
of slightly over .800 in the preemption cases in which it chooses (or
is asked to) participate-high, but comparable to the OSG's general
success rate over time.7
1
As expected, the distribution is asymmetric both along the pro-/anti-
preemption dimension and along the partisan dimension. Whereas
an anti-preemption outcome is highly likely (.85) when the OSG ar-
gues against preemption, anti-preemption parties still have roughly
Easterwood, 507 US 658 (1992); American Airlines v Wolens, 513 US 219 (1994). The
Supreme Court substantially adopted the OSG's position in all three cases, a fact that
provides a first glimpse of the OSG's prominent role and extraordinary success. In one
case (Mansell vMansell, 490 US 581 (1989)), the OSG changed its position very late in
the litigation; we coded the briefs as an Abstention.
69 See W.A., supra
70 We checked whether Solicitors under different Republican administrations-
Reagan, Bush I, Bush H-differed in this respect. The answer is "no."
7 Epstein, et al, Supreme Court Compendium at 675, Table 7-16 (cited in note 44).
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Table 13. Conditional Probabilities, Pro-Preemption Outcome (Weighted)
SG Party
OSG Brief Republican Democrat Total
For Preemption .71 (25.5) .81 (13.5) .74(39.0)
Against Preemption .00(16.5) .29(17.5) .15(34.0)
Abstention .72(16.0) .67(6.0) .70 (22.0)
a one-in-four chance of prevailing when the OSG argues for preemp-
tion-only marginally worse than their batting average in cases where
the OSG abstains. The partisan asymmetries are stark. A Republican
OSG signal in favor of preemption shows no difference to Abstention,
suggesting that the Supreme Court views a Republican pro-preemption
stance as a kind of default position that carries little informational
value. In contrast, a Democratic OSG's pro-preemption brief appears
to increase the likelihood of a ruling to that effect. Conversely, the
Supreme Court appears to view a Democratic OSG's anti-preemption
stance as a kind of default position, whereas Republican OSGs have
a startling 1.000 batting record in arguing against preemption.
The fact that the OSG has an exceptionally high success ratio be-
fore the Supreme Court does not show that OSG briefs have an effect.
A facile inference from success to effect is precluded by a massive en-
dogeneity problem: the institutional role of the OSG as a "Tenth Jus-
tice" and a genuine "friend of the Court" may induce its occupants
to act, think, and argue like Supreme Court clerks. Such an office
may be in a better position than other litigants to predict the likely
disposition of a given case, and more disposed to act on those predic-
tions, than are parties with an agenda other than "getting the law
right" But a perfect endogeneity story fails to explain why Republican
OSGs should be better at predicting the outcomes of one set of cases
(those that go against preemption) than another set (pro-preemption
rulings), while Democratic OSGs have the opposite tendency. It is
easier to tell a coherent signaling story that maps the results. Under
any circumstances, the OSG will tend to defend federal prerogatives.
But a Democratic OSG will face countervailing pressures from liberal
constituencies that want the states to retain an ability to regulate on
top of a federal baseline. Thus, while a Democratic OSG's disavowal
of preemption merits respect, it cannot be taken at face value. In con-
trast, when a Republican OSG disavows preemption, it opts against
both its institutional interest and the administration's business clien-
tele. Its position can readily be taken as the best statement of the law.
To all intents, the case is over.
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E. Regression
Tables 14(a) and 14(b) show, for all cases 72 and contested cases respec-
tively, the results for a regression with four independent variables: the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General, pro- and anti-preemption;
the presence of a state party; and the presence (yea or nay) of a state
amicus against preemption.7 3
Table 14(a). Regression Results, All Cases
Coeff. Std. Error T P > t
OSG No Preemption -. 53 .12 -4.48 0.00
State Party -. 15 .08 -1.79 0.08
State Amicus .02 .09 0.19 0.85
Constant .75 .09 8.03 0.00
Number of Observations: 104
R2 = 0.33
Table 14(b). Regression Results, Contested Cases
Coeff. Std. Error T P > t
OSG No Preemption -. 27 .32 -0.84 0.41
State Party -. 49 .23 -2.12 0.05
State Amicus .13 .27 0.48 0.64
Constant .84 .24 3.53 0.00
Number of Observations: 21
R2 - 0.28
Little difference (and no statistically significant difference) can be
observed between an OSG Abstention and an OSG intervention in
72 As we have done throughout, we exclude the "State versus State" cases and the
cases to which the federal government was a party
13 Given the small number of cases in the dataset, we need to be judicious in choos-
ing our covariates. In general, the variables we do not focus on here generate coeffi-
cients that are not statistically significant in the preemption regressions. This in-
cludes coefficients for the case type dummies, the coefficient on the federal court
variable (which generates a positive coefficient that is not statistically different from
zero), and the variable capturing whether the lower court found for preemption (which
generates a negative coefficient that is not statistically different from zero). In virtu-
ally all specifications in which all cases are included, we find the relationship between
OSG No Preemption and State Party that is presented in Table 14(a).
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favor of preemption.7 4 The effect of the OSG "No Preemption" and
State Participation variables is in the expected direction (i.e., a lower
likelihood of a ruling for preemption). For both variables, the effect is
substantial and, moreover, statistically significant at a .10 level for
"all cases"; for contested cases, the OSG variable loses significance
(quite probably a victim of small numbers). The State Amicus vari-
able has a small effect, which does not approach statistical signifi-
cance and, moreover, points in the wrong direction. To all intents, the
effect is nil. That result does not change when we look at mass briefs
(versus few or no briefs), and it remains the same for any subset or
configuration of cases. In short, we could find no specification under
which state amicus participation makes a statistically significant
difference.7
s
Distinguishing between Republican and Democratic OSGs im-
proves the over-all fit of the model (R2 = .36; regression results not
shown here). We observe no statistically significant effect for "OSG
Preemption" for either political party. The effect of "OSG No Pre-
emption" remains highly significant for both parties; as suggested by
our earlier correlations, it is substantially stronger for Republican
than Democrat OSGs. Predictably, the added variables tend to di-
minish the significance of the State Party variable.
In light of our earlier observations concerning the outcomes differ-
ences between "tort" and "statutory" preemption cases,7 6 we exper-
imented with various specifications containing that variable. Consis-
tently, the tort variable had a small, statistically insignificant effect
and failed to improve the fit of the model. Its principal effect is to ren-
der the State Party variable statistically insignificant. We are inclined
to attribute that fact to a colinearity problem. As noted earlier,7" only
two tort cases involve a state party. While we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that "torts" make a difference, we strongly suspect that it is
the absence of a state party, rather than the nature of the cases, that
explains the higher likelihood of preemption findings in tort cases.
In light of our surprising finding that Private litigants appear to
do better against the States than do Business parties, we examined
whether the presence of Business might render pro-preemption rul-
11 We omit results from this specification which generates a negative coefficient
that is not statistically different from zero on the OSG Preemption variable.
7
- Conceivably, state amicus effects are masked by the OSG variable. Cf. Kearney and
Merrill, 148 U Pa L Rev at 799 (cited in note 49) (suggesting that the Solicitor General's
success may mask effects of disparities of amicus support). But we doubt that that is
what is going on here. If masking occurs due to high correlation, the standard error for
both variables should go up in a multivariate regression. That is not happening.
76 See notes 27-31 and accompanying text, supra.
11 See note 30, supra.
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ings less likely (all else considered). The effect does indeed run in that
direction, but it is small and statistically insignificant.
Finally, we experimented with the possibility that the origin of a
preemption case in state or federal court might have signal value. 78
The underlying intuition is that the Supreme Court might expect
state courts to give short shrift to federal prerogatives. But even the
correlations did not support that surmise, and neither did any regres-
sion. It stands to reason that the signal-if operative at all-will op-
erate principally at the certiorari stage.
F. Future Research
If signaling theory is approximately right, private litigants should
eventually respond to emerging inefficiencies in the signaling "mar-
ket." Their efforts can be observed and analyzed. Such studies might
shed light on our tentative conclusions.
For Business, the principal objective should be to keep the OSG on
the sidelines in cases where the Office might be inclined to argue
against preemption. (As noted, the rewards of having the Solicitor sup-
port preemption in cases where he might be inclined to abstain ap-
pear to be negligible, especially under Republican administrations.)
Symmetrical rewards should accrue to pro-regulatory constituencies
and to the states from having the OSG-and especially a Republican
OSG-argue against preemption in a larger number of cases. Of
course, everyone who has any business before the United States Su-
preme Court is already well aware of the OSG's influence. Interest
groups do lobby the OSG, albeit with the tact and circumspection
that is indicated in lobbying an office that likes to be viewed as being
above politics. (The states, which are naturally bi-partisan and, more-
over, perceived as somewhat more dignified than ordinary lobbies,
may enjoy an advantage.) An empirical examination of these interac-
tions would make for a fascinating study, though not an easy one.
A more manageable (because directly observable) area of investi-
gation is the states' amicus strategy. To be sure, our failure to find sta-
tistically significant effects for state amicus briefs may suggest that
that such briefs tend to be filed to serve the filers' "consumption" in-
terests (for example, a desire to "show the flag"), wholly apart from a
realistic expectation of influencing the outcome. However, our find-
ing is far from robust. In addition to small-numbers problems, par-
ticipation by other amici may mask or mute the effects of state par-
"' We also examined whether the numbers for federal court cases might be might
be unduly influenced by Supreme Court reversals of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. However, this is not the case.
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ticipation.79 Snippets of evidence, moreover, suggest that the states
do pay attention to production values. For example, states are much
more likely to file amicus briefs in contested than in uncontested
cases: while state amicus participation in uncontested cases lies con-
sistently in the 60% range, the rate for contested cases is 70% for the
FRC and approaches 80% for the SRC.80 Similarly, due to the coordi-
nating activities of the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG), the states have professionalized their amicus activities and
substantially increased state participation rates.81 Especially if we are
right in suspecting that mass state participation may signal the au-
thenticity of state concern as well as its intensity, NAAG coordina-
tion may very well be an effective investment.
The intriguing query to our minds arises from our earlier sugges-
tion that the states' amicus strategy looks inefficient, both because
it is targeted to assist petitioners rather than respondents and, more
importantly, because it is more common in State Party than in Non-
Government cases. If those inefficiencies are real, they should not
long persist.
From the states' vantage, the existing pattern of amicus participa-
tion may very well be rational. Such participation is bound to depend
not only on the odds of producing a favorable outcome but also on
transaction costs and consumption values. In State Party cases, NAAG
intervention and coordination is typically prompted by a request
from the party-state-meaning that the first move has been made, by
a trustworthy party s2 Sua sponte coordination by NAAG, or NAAG
coordination at the request of a third (private) party, would likely in-
volve far higher transaction costs. Moreover, much as non-profit firms
participate as amici for reasons of organization maintenance, 83 state
79 Cf. Kearney and Merrill, 148 U Pa L Rev at 821-822 (cited in note 49) (suggesting
an "arms race" explanation of rising amicus participation and arguing that the result-
ing symmetry of amicus filings may obscure their effect).
80 If amicus briefs can be expected to make a difference in any set of cases, it should
be in contested rather than "clear" cases. It is also possible that amicus briefs turn
what would otherwise have been a (near) unanimous case into a contested case. We
have no empirical evidence to support or reject this hypothesis.
"I See Eric N. Waltenburg and Bill Swinford, Litigating Federalism: The States Be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court 47-51 (Greenwood, 1999); Cornell Clayton and Jack Mc-
Guire, State Litigation Strategies and Policymakingin the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 Kan
J L & Pub Pol'y 17 (2001).
82 Also, Dan Schweitzer of the NAAG has suggested to us that the higher rate of am-
icus participation on behalf of petitioners may be explained by the states' antecedent
participation at the certiorari stage. Thus, it no longer needs to be organized at the
merits stage, which effectively lengthens the time that can be allocated to writing and
circulating an amicus brief.
13 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era,
9 J L & Pol 639, 675-676 (1993).
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attorneys general may support a sister-state for reasons of collegiality
and its returns-which, unlike outcome-related returns, can be inter-
nalized by the office-holder. Given these constraints, the states' ami-
cus strategy looks quite focused.
Still, a rational amicus strategy (given transaction costs and other
constraints) is not necessarily efficient from a global perspective. To
put the paradox directly: a signal that is cheap may not be worth a
whole lot. Conversely, a signal that would mean a lot may not be forth-
coming because-well, because it is expensive. The trick, then, is to
drive down the transaction costs. In Non-Government preemption
cases, plaintiffs' attorneys and pro-regulatory constituencies have an
enormous stake in soliciting support for an anti-preemption, "states'
rights" position. They should seek to expand state amicus participa-
tion especially in cases where they are respondents against business
petitioners, which often result in preemption rulings and where, as
noted, state amicus participation is less common than in State Party
cases. The rational strategy would be to mobilize state amici, either
through the attorney general of the litigant's home state or through
the NAAG. In cases where the litigants angle for every conceivable
advantage, the actors' willingness (or not) to make that investment
might provide a real-world test of our analysis.
V. HOW THE JUSTICES VOTE
Statutory preemption cases are often viewed as a species of "feder-
alism." From that vantage, preemption cases present a conundrum,
nicely captured by the United States Supreme Court Judicial Data
Base. That widely used data set includes preemption cases under the
general issue area of "federalism.' 84 Within that issue area, it codes a
"pro-federal" or "anti-state" outcome or vote as "liberal. '8 5 But what-
ever plausibility that coding may have in the context of straightfor-
ward federalism cases, it makes no sense in preemption cases, where
a "liberal" vote for the federal government (and against the states) is
also a vote for "big business" (and against pro-regulatory constituen-
cies that want states to regulate above the federal baseline)-an atti-
tude that the Judicial Database in many other contexts codes as "con-
servative."86 In preemption cases, conservative attitudes (pro-state,
pro-business) conflict, as do the corresponding liberal attitudes.
How do the justices respond to that conflict? The common view is
that conservative (pro-state) and liberal (nationalist) attitudes "flip"
Spaeth, Supreme Court Judicial Database at 50 (cited in note 24) (issue area: Fed-
eralism; issue codes: 910, 911).
85 Id at 51, 53.
86 Id at 52.
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in preemption cases. The bloc of five conservative justices that, for
most of the period here under consideration, has carried the federal-
ism banner (for example, in Commerce Clause, Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and Eleventh Amendment cases)8 7 votes for preemption and
against the states. Conversely, the liberal bloc that has resolutely op-
posed the Rehnquist Court's federalism votes for the states in pre-
emption cases. This Part examines whether, and to what extent, the
justices' voting record conforms to the common view of a massive dis-
continuity-colloquially, a judicial flip-flop-between federalism and
preemption. We find substantial evidence to that effect. However, pre-
emption case law is not an exact mirror image of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism: the voting alignments are substantially more fluid.
Shown below are the conditional probabilities of a pro-preemption
vote for each justice during the FRC and the SRC, for all cases (Figure
4(a)) and contested cases (4(b)). The horizontal lines represent the
conditional probability of a pro-preemption decision by the Court as
a whole for the period under observation.
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Figure 4(a). Probability of Voting for Preemption FRC vs. SRC
Most justices are about as likely to vote for (or against) preemption
as the Court as a whole. Since four out of five preemption cases are
(nearly) unanimous, it would be odd if it were otherwise. In contested
07 All of the landmark cases cited in note 8, supra,were decided by the same 5-4 ma-
jority of justices.
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Figure 4(b). Probability of Voting for Preemption-Contested Cases
cases, the conditional probabilities of a pro-preemption vote diverge
more sharply The prominent outliers-that is, justices with a record
of substantial divergence from the Court average-are Justice White
on the pro-preemption side and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens on the anti-preemption side. In contested cases, Justice Scalia's
record is distinctly more pro-preemption than that of the Court, es-
pecially during the SRC.
A comparison between the FRC and the SRC suggests a hardening of
positions. Figure 4(a) shows that Justice Souter's and Justice Stevens's
anti-preemption positions have become firmer. (In contested cases,
Justice Souter has turned as hostile to preemption as Justice Stevens.)
Personnel changes on the Court have cut in the same direction. Fig-
ure 4(c) plots the "lifetime preemption averages" for the former jus-
tices and their replacements. All of the justices appointed to the
Rehnquist Court (Thomas, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer) are sub-
stantially more hostile to preemption claims than the justices whom
they replaced.
If the Court as a whole has nonetheless failed to move towards a
more pro-state, anti-preemption position, that is because four con-
servative justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and O'Connor) appear to have turned more preemption-friendly
(see Figure 4(a)). In other words, preemption positions appear to have
hardened on both sides.
The conventional spatial array of the SRC has Justice Stevens at one
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(liberal) pole, followed in order by Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, O'Con-
nor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. 8 With the conspic-
uous exception of Justice Thomas, the justices' voting record in
preemption cases matches this array: as we move from liberal to con-
servative, the preemption "scores" go up, with a noticeable disconti-
nuity between the liberals on one side and moderates and conserva-
tives (excepting Thomas) on the other.
Table 15. Pro-Preemption Votes
Lifetime SRC
Stevens .41 .38
Ginsburg .41 .41
Breyer .43 .43
Souter .43 .45
O'Connor .52 .56
Kennedy .53 .55
Rehnquist .50 .55
Scalia .56 .57
Thomas .44 .43
18 See Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 Pol Analysis
134 passim (2002).
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The analysis suggests the emergence of a conservative bloc for pre-
emption (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Scalia) and an equally cohesive bloc of liberal anti-preemption
justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens). That impression seems
to be demonstrated in Figure 4(d), which plots the LRC justices' vot-
ing records in all cases and in contested cases: in the contested cases,
the blocs seem to harden.
qScalia
E
Rehnquist OConnor Kennedy
Court
)Scalia OConnor Toa
Rehnquist S o Thomas Kennedy
a 0 Court
Souter Thomas Breyer
* Ginsburg r
Stevens 0
Breyer
Stevens Souter
Ginsburg
0
Preemption-All a PreemptionContested
Figure 4(d). Probability of Voting for Preemption-SRC
The coalitions here look like the mirror image of the pro-state and
anti-state blocs in straightforward federalism cases, with this qualifi-
cation: Justice Thomas appears to play the role of the swing vote that,
in federalism cases, falls to Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor.
A closer examination of contested preemption cases, however, re-
veals a more complicated picture. Table 16(a) below shows the num-
ber of times each justice voted with the majority on contested pre-
emption issues during the SRC. At first impression, the Table appears
to confirm the ideological division. Note, though, the conspicuous
lack of zeroes and the paucity of "perfect scores": there appears to be
no single "swing vote" that controls the outcomes. In any given case,
though, it appears possible to pick up a vote from this or that "un-
likely" justice.
Table 16(b) provides better evidence in support of that observa-
tion. It shows the likelihood of justices voting with one another in
contested preemption cases (SRC only). Only eleven of the 36 paired
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Table 16(a). Frequency of Voting with the Majority in Contested Holdings (SRC)
Pro-Preemption (6) Anti-Preemption (4) All Contested (10)
Rehnquist 4 1 5
Scalia 5 1 6
O'Connor 4 1 5
Kennedy 5 2 7
Thomas 4 2 6
Stevens 2 3 5
Souter 3 4 7
Ginsburg 1 4 5
Breyer 3 4 7
observations are significant at a. 10 level; and, six of those eleven ob-
servations bear a negative sign (indicating a statistically significant
likelihood that the paired justices will be found on opposite sides).
8 9 If
we cannot easily find matching pairs, we certainly cannot find blocs.
The Table suggests that Justice Ginsburg anchors the anti-
preemption vote; it affirmatively tells us that Justice Stevens and
Chief Justice Rehnquist will be on opposite sides in any given case.
Only Justice Breyer's record, however, correlates significantly with
that of the Court as a whole. It is very difficult to interpret the evi-
dence as an indication of ideological bloc voting. Conservative jus-
tices tend to vote for preemption in many cases, and liberal justices
tend to do the opposite. But neither side seems to agree on what cases,
precisely, call for the "default" response.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our principal purpose has been descriptive: we have sought to provide
an accurate and complete picture of the Rehnquist Court's statutory
preemption decisions. Our explanation has been tentative and pre-
liminary. Some intriguing aspects of the Rehnquist Court's preemp-
tion performance-notably, the startling changes in the mix of pre-
emption cases from the First to the Second Rehnquist Court 90-we
cannot explain at all. With respect to case outcomes, the intuitive
from of "cue" or signaling theory that we have employed does not map
easily onto any of the standard models (or any of their sophisticated
variations)-attitudinal, strategic, or legal.
We hope that our preliminary analysis will prompt more ambitious
89 The observations here are weighted. For unweighted observations, no pairing
shows significance.
90 See text at notes 42-45, supra.
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theoretical efforts, and we ourselves plan to conduct more rigorous
analyses. There is a powerful reason, though, to approach preemp-
tion cases with theoretical humility. In contrast to the sorts of cases
that have been the subject-matter of the vast bulk of the theoretical
literature, preemption cases are multi-dimensional, both in that
they bring judicial attitudes in conflict and in that they involve mul-
tiple layers of legal argument, from statutory interpretation to dele-
gation to federalism. Even a ruthlessly "attitudinal" or "strategic"
judge-one who consistently votes to maximize his political pref-
erences-would confront difficult trade-offs in this environment.
Scholars have observed that preemption cases are unlikely to yield
clear confirmation for either an "attitudinal" or a "legal" model of ju-
dicial behavior.91
A great deal of academic commentary has focused on the perceived
discontinuity between the Rehnquist Court's averred solicitude of
states' rights and its continued (albeit uneasy) support for "implied"
preemption. More preemption, the theory goes, ipso facto means less
federalism. At the same time (the theory continues), more preemp-
tion means less regulation: if more federal statutes are held to pre-
empt state regulation, at least some states will be precluded from reg-
ulating on top of federal minimum standards. The situation in "pure"
federalism cases is the reverse: here, a vote for "states' rights" typi-
cally means less regulation. (If the Congress lacks the authority to
enact a Gun-Free School Zones Act, at least some states will choose
not to enact an equivalent state law.) A consistent advocate of states'
rights should vote for states' rights in all federalism cases, including
preemption cases. Conversely, a consistent "nationalist" should de-
fend federal supremacy in both types of cases. If a justice's voting be-
havior changes depending on the type of case ("pure" federalism or
preemption), that switch must be driven by attitudes for or against reg-
ulation, rather than legal considerations pertaining to federalism and
states' rights. Discontinuities between federalism and preemption
cases should (on the theory just sketched) count as a major victory for
the attitudinal model-a conclusive demonstration that "concepts
of states' rights and national supremacy are used opportunistically,
when convenient, to defend specific rulings, but not as guiding prin-
ciples for decision-making."92
91 Bill Swinford and Eric N. Waltenburg, The Consistency of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 'Pro-State' Bloc, 28:2 Publius 25 (1998).
92 Baybeck and Lowry, 30:3 Publius at 96 (cited in note 1). The authors claim that
statutory preemption cases provide a unique test for the attitudinal model because
"constitutional issues (as opposed to regulation) are more complex, and any model
would have to factor in issues related to constitutional law." Id at 84. Wrongly believing
that statutory preemption cases involve no such inconvenient distractions, the authors
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This seemingly robust result, though, is produced by re-designating
one set of attitudes (pro- or anti-state, which the canonical Supreme
Court Judicial Database codes as an attitudinal variable)93 as a legal
principle, while letting the second, conflicting set (pro- or anti-
business) continue to operate as expressing an attitude. This is a
sleight of hand. 94 If the federalism variable remains an attitude, the
true test for an attitudinal or strategic model is to explain how jus-
tices resolve conflicts among those attitudes or preferences. If the fed-
eralism variable becomes a legal principle, one has to allow that the
legal arguments that support the principle may also define its reach.
Put less abstractly: one has to allow for the possibility that a legal fed-
eralism principle may not cover statutory preemption cases at all-
and that it may explain why those cases have nothing to do with fed-
eralism.
95
To be sure, an ostensibly legal distinction may itself be based on at-
titudinal or strategic considerations-most obviously perhaps, by a
desire to shield business from the potential impact of the Rehnquist
Court's states' rights enthusiasm. But this inference, too, is at best
premature. The clearest illustration is the dormant Commerce Clause,
which is continuous with "implied" statutory preemption. (Implied
statutory preemption operates against states when Congress has ex-
pressed its intent to preempt only unclearly; the dormant Commerce
Clause bars discriminatory state legislation when Congress has said
nothing at all or failed to clearly authorize such state laws.) Justice
Stevens is the most aggressive advocate of the "dormant" Commerce
Clause. Justice Scalia, in contrast, has denounced it as an extra-
constitutional invention and as akin to free-market sloganeering.
96
construct a model with two binary variables (states' rights' versus nationalist; liberal
versus conservative) and confidently reach the conclusion quoted in the text. Id at 96.
9- See note 86 and accompanying text, supra.
94 It is not the only such maneuver in the attitudinal literature. For a trenchant cri-
tique of one such move, strikingly similar to the one here at issue, see Richard A. Bris-
bin, Jr., Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth, and the Function of Law in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 40 Am J Pol Sci 1004, 1008 (1996) (critiquing Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme
Court Justices, 40 Am J Pol Sci 971 (1996)).
95 For a few suggestions to that effect see Greve, 7 Tex Rev L & Polit at 116-17 (cited
in note 7).
96 See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 US 175, 200 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause "is 'negative' not
only because it negates state regulation of commerce, but also because it does not ap-
pear in the Constitution."); and West Lynn Creamery Inc v Healy, 512 US 186, 207
(1994) (Scalia, J., diss.) (accusing the majority of having "canvassed the entire corpus of
negative-Commerce-Clause opinions, culled out every free-market snippet of reason-
ing, and melded them into the sweeping principle that the Constitution is violated by
any state law or regulation that" obstructs national markets.).
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Yet when it comes to "implied" federal preemption-that is, cases
where Congress has mumbled, as distinct from remaining entirely
silent-Justice Stevens emerges as a defender of state prerogatives,
and Justice Scalia often takes the opposite tack. One could argue that
both justices are being incoherent-that one cannot have a robust
implied preemption doctrine without a dormant Commerce Clause,
or (conversely) that a dormant Commerce Clause well-nigh compels
a recognition of implied preemption. Quite obviously, though, the per-
ceived discontinuity on either side cannot be attributed to pro- or anti-
business attitudes.
Beyond our call for theoretical caution in this area, we hazard one
last guess: perhaps, the messy stability of preemption law has to do
with the fact that that body of law lacks any systematic connection
to federalism values. True, the justices' analysis often purports to be
guided by generalized federalism presumptions-prominently, a pre-
sumption against implying federal preemption in areas of "tradi-
tional state authority"9 However, nothing in the existing doctrinal
framework bears a connection to a traditional, constitutional feder-
alism that would let the states govern their own internal affairs (for
example, on labor relations), while entrusting the federal government
with the task of preventing discrimination and aggression among the
states (for example, in the form of regulatory and tax exports). A se-
rious reflection on the constitutional equilibrium might bring more
coherence to preemption law, and it might reduce the perceived dis-
continuities between federalism and preemption law. It would ulti-
mately have to rest, however, on constitutional intuitions that the
Rehnquist Court has largely failed to articulate even in constitu-
tional cases. Having failed to do so, the Court has nothing to fall back
on in preemption cases but manipulable presumptions and con-
testable interpretations of statutory language and congressional in-
tent-and signals.
97 The origin of this oft-quoted presumption is Rice v Santa Fe Elevator, 331 US 218,
229 (1947) ("the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
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Appendix A
Preemption Cases in the Rehnquist Court
First Rehnquist Court
1986 R.I. Reynolds Tobacco Co v Durham County, N.C., 479 US 130 (1986).
1986 California Federal Sav & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US 272 (1987).
1986 324 Liquor Corp v Duffy, 479 US 335 (1987).
1986 International Paper Co v Ouellette, 479 US 481 (1987).
1986 California Coastal Com'n v Granite Rock Co, 480 US 572 (1987).
1986 Pilot Life Ins Co v Dedeaux, 481 US 41 (1987).
1986 Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Taylor, 481 US 58 (1987).
1986 CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp of America, 481 US 69 (1987).
1986 Rose v Rose, 481 US 619 (1987).
1986 International Broth of Elec Workers, AFL-CIO v Hechler, 481 US 851
(1987).
1986 Fort Halifax Packing Co Inc v Coyne, 482 US 1 (1987).
1986 Caterpillar Inc v Williams, 482 US 386 (1987).
1986 Perry v Thomas, 482 US 483 (1987).
1987 Schneidewind vANR Pipeline Co, 485 US 293 (1988).
1987 Bennett v Arkansas, 485 US 395 (1988).
1987 Puerto Rico Dept of Consumer Affairs v Isla Petroleum Corp, 485 US 495
(1988).
1987 City of New York v FCC, 486 US 57 (1988).
1987 Goodyear Atomic Corp v Miller, 486 US 174 (1988).
1987 Lingle v Norge Div of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 US 399 (1988).
1987 Mackey v Lanier Collection Agency & Service Inc, 486 US 825 (1988).
1987 Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 (1988).
1987 Mississippi Power & Light Co v Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487 US 354
(1988).
1988 Shell Oil Co v Iowa Dept of Revenue, 488 US 19 (1988).
1988 Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats Inc, 489 US 141 (1989).
1988 Volt Information Sciences Inc v Board of Trustees of Stanford, 489 US 468
(1989).
1988 Northwest Central Pipeline Corp v State Corp Com'n of Kansas, 489 US
493 (1989).
1988 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30 (1989).
1988 California v ARC America Corp, 490 US 93 (1989).
1988 Massachusetts v Morash, 490 US 107 (1989).
1988 Cotton Petroleum Corp v New Mexico, 490 US 163 (1989).
1988 Mansell v Mansell, 490 US 581 (1989).
1988 ASARCO Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605 (1989).
1989 Golden State Transit Corp v City of Los Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989).
1989 Adams Fruit Company Inc v Barrett, 494 US 638 (1990).
1989 United Steelworkers of America v Rawson, 495 US 362 (1990).
1989 North Dakota v US, 495 US 423 (1990).
1989 California v FERC, 495 US 490 (1990).
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1989 English v General Elec Co, 496 US 72 (1990).
1990 FMC Corp v Holliday, 498 US 52 (1990).
1990 Ingersoll-Rand Co v McClendon, 498 US 133 (1990).
1990 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US 597 (1991).
1991 Barker v Kansas, 503 US 594 11992).
1991 Morales v Trans World Airlines, 504 US 374 (1992).
1991 Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 US 88 (1992).
1991 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504 (1992).
1992 District of Columbia v Greater Washington Bd of Trade, 506 US 125
(1992).
1992 Itel Containers Intern Corp v Huddleston, 507 US 60 (1993).
1992 Building & Con Traders v Builders & Contractors of Mass, 507 US 218
(1993).
1992 CSX Transp, Inc v Easterwood, 507 US 658 (1993).
1992 US Department of Treasury v Fabe, 508 US 491 (1993).
1993 John Hancock Mut Life Ins v Harris Trust & Sav Bank, 510 US 86 (1993).
1993 Department of Revenue of Oregon v ACI Industries Inc, 510 US 332
(1994).
1993 Northwest Airlines v County of Kent, 510 US 355 (1994).
1993 American Dredging Co v Miller, 510 US 443 (1994).
1993 PUD No 1 of Jefferson County v Washington Dept of Ecology, 511 US 700
(1994).
1993 Dpt of Taxation & Finance of NY v Millhelm Attea & Bros Inc, 512 US 61
(1994).
1993 Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US 107 (1994).
1993 Hawaiian Airlines Inc v Norris, 512 US 246 (1994).
Second Rehnquist Court
1994 Nebraska Dept of Revenue v Loewenstein, 513 US 123 (1994).
1994 American Airlines Inc v Wolens, 513 US 219 (1995).
1994 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies Inc v Dobson, 513 US 265 (1995).
1994 Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 US 52 (1995).
1994 Anderson v Edwards, 514 US 143 (1995).
1994 Freightliner Corp v Myrick, 514 US 280 (1995).
1994 New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers
Ins Co, 514 US 645 (1995).
1995 Dalton v Little Rock Family Planning Services, 516 US 474 (1996).
1995 Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA v Nelson, 517 US 25 (1996).
1995 Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681 (1996).
1995 Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), NA, 517 US 735 (1996).
1995 Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470 (1996).
1996 Atherton v FDIC, 519 US 213 (1996). 1996 Ca Div of Labor Standards Enft v
Dillingham Const, NA, Inc, 519 US 316 (1997). 1996 De Buono v NYSA-ILA
Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 US 806 (1997). 1996 Boggs v Boggs,
520 US 833 (1997).
1997 Foster v Love, 522 US 67 (1997).
1997 ATT v Central Office Telephone Inc, 524 US 214 (1998).
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1998 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd v Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 US 155 (1999).
1998 Humana Inc v Forsyth, 525 US 299 (1999).
1998 AZ Department of Revenue v Blaze Construction Company, 526 US 32
(1999).
1998 UNUM Life Ins Co of America v Ward, 526 US 358 (1999).
1999 US v Locke, 529 US 89 (2000).
1999 Norfolk Southern Ry Co v Shanklin, 529 US 344 (2000).
1999 Geier v American Honda Motor Co Inc, 529 US 861 (2000).
1999 Pegram v Herdrich, 530 US 211 (2000).
1999 Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
2000 Dir of Revenue v CoBank ACB, 531 US 316 (2001).
2000 Buckman Co v Plaintiff's Legal Committee, 531 US 341 (2001).
2000 Circuit City Stores Inc v Adams, 532 US 105 (2001).
2000 Egelhoff v Egelhoff ex rel Breiner, 532 US 141 (2001).
2000 Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly, 533 US 525 (2001).
2001 Wisconsin Dept of Health & Family Services v Blumer, 534 US 473
(2002).
2001 New York v FERC, 535 US 1 (2002).
2001 Rush v Moran, 536 US 355 (2002).
2001 City of Columbus v Ours Garage & Wrecker Service Inc, 536 US 424
(2002).
2002 Sprietsma v Mercury Marine, 537 US 51 (2002).
2002 Ky Ass'n of Health Plans Inc v Miller, 538 US 329 (2003).
2002 Pharm Research & Mfrs of Am v Walsh, 538 US 644 (2003).
2002 Entergy La Inc v La PSC, 539 US 39 (2003).
2002 Ben Nat'l Bank v Anderson, 539 US 1 (2003).
2002 American Ins Assn v Garamendi, 123 SCt 2374 (2003).
2002 Green Tree Fin Corp v Bazzle, 123 SCt 2402 (2003).
2002 Hillside Dairy Inc v Lyons, 539 US 59 (2003).
2003 Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v So Coast Air Quality Mgmt Dist, 561 US
246 (2004).
2003 Nixon v Missouri Municipal League, 541 US 125 (2004).
2003 Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 US 200 (2004).
Appendix B
Case Search and Selection Criteria
We conducted a LEXIS basic keyword search for all Supreme Court
cases from 1986 to the present with the words "preemption," "pre-
empt," or "preempted." Conducted in October 2003, that search gen-
erated 129 cases, 116 of which were decided during William Rehn-
quist's tenure as Chief Justice. Predictably, that broad search proved
over-inclusive; a review of the opinions identified 81 genuine statu-
tory preemption cases.
We identified an additional 24 cases through less systematic means,
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such as reviews of the pertinent legal literature. We also cross-checked
our case set against earlier studies of the topic98 and against the
United States Supreme Court Judicial Database.99 Finally, three pre-
emption cases were decided during the 2003-2004, after our LEXIS
search. We coded and added these cases in July 2004.
Our interest is statutory federal preemption, meaning the pre-
emption of state law under federal statutes or administrative regula-
tions. Accordingly, we excluded, in addition to straightforward con-
stitutional cases, four types of cases:
a. Cases in which Section 1983 serves to enforce constitutional
rights. While Section 1983 is of course a "statute," the inclu-
sion of cases where that provision is used to enforce substan-
tive constitutional rights would have swept up an enormous
number of cases that are fundamentally "about" those rights,
rather than the nature and scope of statutory preemption. 00
b. Cases involving the imposition of affirmative obligations on
states, typically under a federal statute conferring private rights
of action.'0 '
c. Cases involving federal common law preemption, 10 2 such as
constitutional canons of construction governing Indian af-
fairs'03 and, most important, the dormant Commerce Clause.
However, we included the handful of cases involving preemp-
tion under U.S. treaties or executive agreements with foreign
nations. 0 4
d. Cases involving the (state or federal) judiciary's authority to
enforce arguably preemptive federal rules. Cases concerning
91 O'Brien, 23 Publius 15 (cited in note 1); Waltenburg and Swinford, Litigating Fed-
eralism at 107-109 (cited in note 81).
99 The United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, issue codes 910 and 911,
yields 76 preemption cases for the 1986-2002 Terms, eight of which are not true pre-
emption cases. In addition to the remaining 62 matches with our cases, we identified
another 34 statutory preemption cases during the period.
100 Our cases include one decision about the preemptive scope of Section 1983 it-
self: Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 (1988).
101 For example, Gregory vAshcroft, 501 US 452 (1991) is sometimes read as a pre-
emption case and included in preemption case samples (e.g., O'Brien, 23 Publius at 24-
25 [cited in note 1). By our criteria, Gregory is not a preemption case.
102 E.g., O'Melveny & Myers v FDIC, 512 US 79 (1994); Boyle v United Technol-
ogies, 487 US 500 (1988).
'
0 3 E.g., California v Cabazon, 480 US 202 (1987) (counted in other samples as a pre-
emption case).
104 E.g., American Airlines v Wolens, 513 US 219 (1995) (Warsaw Convention);
American Insurance Ass'n v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003) (executive agreements or
"policies").
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federal abstention or the concurrent authority of state courts
to enforce federal law fall into this category.""5
Some cases involve questions in addition to statutory preemption
(for example, dormant Commerce Clause claims). We included those
cases so long as the preemption claim occupied a non-trivial part of
the Court's opinion. Importantly, we coded the case outcomes and
judicial votes exclusively on the statutory preemption dimension.
For example, a holding or vote to the effect that a particular state law
is not preempted by statute but is preempted under the dormant
Commerce Clause would be coded as a decision or vote against pre-
emption.
Appendix C
The coding of "mixed" preemption cases and votes presents undeni-
able difficulties. Excluding the cases and votes would sacrifice much
valuable information and, moreover, skew the analysis. An examina-
tion of (often very similar) state law provisions or claims in one and
the same case compels justices to articulate their preemption views
with some care and specificity. For this reason, the mixed cases tend
to be precedent-setting and as highly instructive with respect to the
individual justices' views. The alternative option of making a series
of "gut calls" and scoring the rulings as unambiguously for or against
preemption would involve a great deal of arbitrariness and, moreover,
distorted what the justices thought they were doing in those cases.
With one exception, 10 6 the mixed cases present separate state law
claims and provisions, which the Court subjected to individualized
preemption analysis and which yielded separate holdings.
Accordingly, we decided to treat the holdings and opinions in
"mixed" cases as separate observations. To illustrate: in Cipollone v.
Liggett, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), a plurality of four justices (Stevens, Rehn-
quist, White, and O'Connor) held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (FCLAA) preempted some, but not all, tort lia-
bility claims under state law. Three justices (Blackmun, Kennedy, and
Souter) held that all of the plaintiff's state law claims should be al-
105 The Judicial Database includes some such cases under "preemption!' E.g.,
Tafflin v Levitt, 493 US 455 (1990) (concurrent state court jurisdiction over RICO ac-
tions); Yellow Freight v Donnelly, 494 US 820 (1989) (concurrent state court jurisdic-
tion in Title VII actions).
106 In International Paper Co v Ouelette, 479 US 481 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that the Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1251 et seq., preempts common law nuisance
suits over interstate water pollution when the claim is based on the common law of
the "receiving" state but not when it is based on the law of the source state.
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lowed to proceed. Two justices (Scalia and Thomas) opined that all of
the plaintiff's claims were preempted. We scored the case and the
votes twice, as follows (with "P" denoting a vote for preemption and
"NP" a vote against):
Plurality Blackmun Group Scalia/Thomas Outcome Vote
P NP P P 6-3
NP NP P NP 2-7
In dealing with the problem of multiple majorities, some scholars
have, for statistical purposes, scored those cases twice (without weight-
ing them). 10 7 We have instead weighted each observation at 50 percent
to account for the possibility of strategic voting or "vote trading" in
mixed cases.108 Weighting the observations is a rough and ready
means of dealing with possibly interdependent observations.10 9
107 See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman and Suzanna Sherry All or Nothing: Explaining the
Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 NC L Rev 1225, 1240 (2000).
108 Not all preemption rulings or claims are created equal. Cippolone, for example,
was at the time widely viewed as a victory for the tobacco industry and its pro-
preemption position. However, weighting the observations in mixed cases at anything
other than 50:50, on a case-by-case basis, would have introduced an excessive degree of
subjectivity.
09 While interdependence may also occur in consecutive cases, the simultaneous
examination of state law claims in a single case creates a greater possibility of strate-
gic voting. For a simple example, justices be inclined in a difficult preemption case to
"split the difference" between several state law claims. That is much harder to do in
consecutive cases.
